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Abstract
The hedge fund industry has grown to be one of the most important segments of the financial services 
industry. Hedge funds are known for employing highly dynamic trading strategies and investing in 
illiquid assets to increase their profitability. In this thesis, we develop and test the models that capture 
the time-varying nature of liquidity and profitability o f hedge funds.
The thesis begins with the study of the liquidity of hedge funds’ investments. We propose a 
method for determining the factors that affect the (unobservable) liquidity of hedge fund investments. 
We find substantial evidence of time variation in the liquidity of hedge fund returns, and that this 
time variation can be predicted with readily available data.
We then examine the impact of market dispersion on the profitability of hedge funds. Market 
dispersion is measured by cross-sectional volatility, that is, the standard deviation across all asset 
returns in one time period. We exploit the information held in the cross-sectional dispersion of equity 
returns and find that market dispersion and the performance o f hedge funds are positively related 
across all equity-oriented hedge funds.
Furthermore, to gain a better understanding of hedge fund risk, in the third chapter we assess the 
empirical success o f Fung-Hsieh, Fama-French and Statistical Factor Models for explaining hedge 
fund returns and compare their explanatory power for the cross section o f hedge fund returns.
In the final chapter, we introduce a general and flexible framework for hedge fund performance 
evaluation and asset allocation: stochastic dominance theory. Our approach utilizes statistical tests for 
stochastic dominance to evaluate the performance of hedge funds. To illustrate the method’s ability 
to work with non-normal distributions, we form hedge fund portfolios by using stochastic dominance 
criteria and examine the out-of-sample performance of these hedge fund portfolios. Compared to 
performance of portfolios of randomly selected hedge funds and mean-variance efficient hedge 
funds, our results show that fund selection method based on stochastic dominance criteria greatly 
improves the performance of hedge fund portfolios.
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Introduction
The hedge fund industry has grown to be one of the most important segments of the financial services 
industry. Hedge funds are known for employing highly dynamic trading strategies and investing in 
illiquid assets to increase their profitability. In this thesis, we develop and test the models that capture 
the time-varying nature of liquidity and profitability of hedge funds.
The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter focuses on the liquidity of hedge funds' 
investments. It is o f great interest both to hedge fund investors and to market regulators. We propose a 
method for determining the factors that affect the (unobservable) liquidity o f hedge fund investments. 
Our method exploits the link between illiquidity and serial correlation in hedge fund returns established 
by Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004), and does not require information on the actual positions taken 
by the hedge fund, nor even the 'style' o f the hedge fund; we use only the returns reported by the hedge 
fund and other easily observed information. Using a panel o f monthly returns on over 600 individual 
hedge funds, we find significant evidence of time variation in the degree o f liquidity o f hedge fund 
investments. Broadly stated, hedge funds in equity-based styles, such as equity market neutral and 
equity hedge or non-hedge, exhibit decreases in liquidity when stock market returns are low and bond 
market returns are high. In contrast, hedge funds in fixed income styles, such as convertible arbitrage or 
fixed income, exhibit lower liquidity when equity market volatility is high, and when the fund 
experiences in-flows or out-flows of funds.
We then examine the impact of market dispersion on the performance of hedge funds. Market 
dispersion is measured by cross-sectional volatility, that is, the standard deviation across all asset 
returns in one time period. We exploit the information held in the cross-sectional dispersion of equity 
returns and find that market dispersion and the performance o f hedge funds are positively related across 
all equity-oriented hedge funds. Containing information very different from other factors, cross- 
sectional volatility is an important determinant o f hedge fund returns. We also find the level of hedge 
fund return dispersion is positively related to the level of market dispersion.
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To gain a better understanding o f hedge fund risk, in the third chapter we assess the empirical 
success of Fung and Hsieh (2004) asset based style factors, a five-factor extension of Fama-French 
factors and statistical factors for explaining the hedge fund returns. We document that the first two sets 
of factor models explain a significant part o f the systematic exposure o f hedge funds and that the 
explanatory power of the five-factor extension of Fama and French is larger than those o f the Fung and 
Hsieh seven-factor for all categories except for Distressed Securities and Fixed Income Arbitrage. 
Asymptotic principal component analysis of the individual fund regression residuals reveals that there 
are latent factors which are not captured by Fung-Hsieh and Fama-French models.
In the final chapter, we introduce a general and flexible framework for hedge fund performance 
evaluation and asset allocation: stochastic dominance (SD) theory. Our approach utilizes statistical tests 
for stochastic dominance to compare the returns o f hedge funds. We form hedge fund portfolios by 
using SD criteria and examine the out-of-sample performance of these hedge fund portfolios. Compared 
to performance o f portfolios o f randomly selected hedge funds and mean-variance efficient hedge 
funds, our results show that fund selection method based on SD criteria greatly improves the 
performance o f hedge fund portfolio.
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Chapter 1
Time-Varying Liquidity in Hedge Fund Returns
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Time-Varying Liquidity in Hedge Fund Returns*
Sheng Li and Andrew J. P atton  
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A bstract
The liquidity of hedge funds’ investments is of great interest both to hedge fund investors 
and to market regulators. We propose a method for determining the factors that affect the 
(unobservable) liquidity of hedge fund investments. Our method exploits the link between 
illiquidity and serial correlation in hedge fund returns established by Getmansky, Lo and 
Makarov (2004), and does not require information on the actual positions taken by the 
hedge fund, nor even the ‘style’ of the hedge fund; we use only the returns reported by the 
hedge fund and other easily observed information.
Using a panel of monthly returns on over 600 individual hedge funds, we find significant 
evidence of time variation in the degree of liquidity of hedge fund investments. Broadly 
stated, hedge funds in equity-based styles, such as equity market neutral and equity hedge 
or non-hedge, exhibit decreases in liquidity when stock market returns are low and bond 
market returns axe high. In contrast, hedge funds in fixed income styles, such as convertible 
arbitrage or fixed income, exhibit lower liquidity when equity market volatility is high, and 
when the fund experiences in-flows or out-flows of funds.
Keywords: Liquidity; Serial correlation; R eturn  sm oothing; H edge funds
*H elpful com m ents and suggestions on th is work were received from  G iovanni B eliossi, R obert 
K osow ski, K evin  Sheppard, M ichela Verardo, and sem inar participants at th e  A dam  S m ith  A sset 
P ricin g  workshop and L ancaster University.
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1 Introduction
The liquidity of hedge funds’ investments is of great interest to hedge fund investors and 
to market regulators. The degree of investment liquidity directly affects the liquidity that 
the fund can offer its investor; funds with less liquid investments require longer “lock-up” 
and redemption notification periods from their investors in order to avoid costly exits from 
illiquid investments. Regulators have expressed much concern about the liquidity of hedge 
funds’ investments and the potential market impact of the collapse of a fund1. The 1998 Long 
Term Capital Management crisis highlighted liquidity as a particularly important source of 
risk for hedge funds, for both investors and regulators.
Whilst there is much interest in hedge fund liquidity, it remains an elusive concept to 
measure and has a variety of definitions and interpretations. Most definitions suggest, in 
some way, that highly liquid markets are those where it is possible to trade large quantities of 
the asset quickly and at low cost. Measures of liquidity for standard assets include variables 
such as the bid-ask spread, the volume of turnover, and possibly the depth of the best bid and 
ask quotes. Using these, and other proxies for liquidity, the liquidity risk in stock and bond 
markets has been intensively studied2. The liquidity risk of hedge funds has recently begun 
to attract attention, though the problem is complicated by the fact that the liquidity proxies 
used in studies of stock and bond markets are not directly applicable to hedge funds. The 
attention to hedge fund liquidity comes at an important time: the assets under management 
by hedge funds was estimated to have surpassed $1.4 trillion at the end of 2006, a 40% 
increase over the previous 12 months, and approximately a 28-fold increase since 1990.
A number of recent papers have studied the returns generated by hedge funds, though
1 As pointed out by the new Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
A tlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference: "Much of the recent debate...has focused on the opacity of 
hedge funds to regulatory authorities and to the markets generally, which is viewed by some as an important 
source of liquidity risk. Liquidity in a particular market segment might well decline sharply and unexpectedly 
if hedge funds chose or were forced to reduce a large exposure in that segment. Concerns about hedge fund 
opacity and possible liquidity risk have motivated a range of proposals for regulatory authorities to create 
and maintain a database of hedge fund positions."
2 See Fleming (2003), P&stor and Stambaugh (2003), Fujimoto (2004), Avramov, et al. (2005), Chordia, 
et al. (2005), Goldreich, et al. (2005) and Johnson (2006), amongst others.
2
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none of these studies directly focus on the liquidity risk of hedge funds3. Hedge fund liquidity, 
generally considered, has various aspects. From the perspective of the investors in hedge 
funds, the “lock-up” and redemption notice periods are the sources of illiquidity of most 
concern. The lock-up period is the period that investors must wait before withdrawing their 
initial investment in the fund, and is usually on the order of one to eighteen months. The 
redemption notice period is the notification period required before investors can redeem 
their shares, which is usually one to three months. The main source of illiquidity from 
the perspective of the hedge fund manager is the liquidity of the fund’s investments. As 
mentioned above, the liquidity of the fund’s investments and that offered to the fund’s 
investor’s, in the form of lock-up and redemption periods, are connected: hedge funds with 
longer lock-up and redemption periods may invest in more illiquid assets, which may provide 
greater profit opportunities.
The two aspects of hedge fund liquidity have very different properties. The illiquidity 
imposed on hedge fund investors by the fund itself, through the lock-up and redemption 
notice periods, has two important properties: it is constant through time and is directly 
observable, both to the investor (of course) and to the researcher. The illiquidity caused by 
the fund’s investments in illiquid assets, on the other hand, will generally not possess either 
of these properties: the degree of liquidity will not necessarily be constant, and the degree 
of liquidity is not directly observable.
Using the first type of liquidity as a risk measure, Aragon (2007) finds that liquidity helps 
explain expected hedge fund returns. He shows that there is a positive, concave relationship 
between a hedge fund’s excess returns and its redemption notice period. He also documents 
that the difference in excess returns on lockup versus non-lockup funds is about 4% per 
annum in aggregate.
The study by Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) (henceforth GLM) on possible sources
3Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Agarwal and Naik (2000), Edwards and Caglayan (2001), 
Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2002) and Liang (1999, 2000, 2001) provide comprehensive studies of historical hedge 
fund performance. Another strand of literature focuses more on the risk and return characteristics in specific 
hedge fund strategies. For example, Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) study the “risk-arbitrage” strategy; Fung 
and Hsieh (2001) focus on the “trend following” strategy and Agarwal and Naik (2004) study a number of 
equity-oriented strategies.
3
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of serial correlation in hedge fund returns helps shed light on the harder-to-measure illiquidity
\
resulting from investments. GLM note that correlation between reported returns on hedge 
funds in consecutive months (i.e., the first-order serial correlation, or autocorrelation, of the 
reported returns) is much higher than is commonly found in liquid equity or bond returns. 
They systematically examine numerous possible sources of serial correlation in hedge fund 
returns, and show that market inefficiencies, time-varying expected returns, time-varying 
leverage, and incentive fees with high water marks can all generate serial correlation in 
observed fund returns. However none of these sources can generate the magnitude of serial 
correlation found in the data. They conclude that the observed serial correlation must be 
the result of exposure to illiquid assets, which can lead to non-synchronicity problems in 
valuing the assets in the portfolio, inadvertent smoothing due to “marking to model” (as 
opposed to marking to market), and/or deliberate performance smoothing by managers4. 
Nonsynchronous trading of assets in a portfolio is well known to lead to autocorrelation in 
portfolio returns, see Shanken (1987) or Lo and MacKinlay (1990) for example. Marking to 
model will usually lead to serially correlated returns, even for sophisticated pricing models5. 
Further, by influencing how illiquid assets are marked to model hedge fund managers also 
have the ability to “manage” their reported monthly returns. Lo (2001) argued that given 
the nature of hedge fund compensation contracts and performance statistics, managers have 
an incentive to “smooth” their returns by marking their portfolios to less than their actual 
value in months with large positive returns so as to create a “cushion” for those months 
with lower returns6. This directly results in lower volatility of reported returns and higher 
Sharpe ratios, see Liew and French (2005). Agarwal et al. (2006) find evidence consistent 
with hedge fund managers manipulating their reported December returns so as to favourably
4The connection between (il)liquidity and serial correlation in equity returns has been explored by Camp­
bell, et al. (1993) and Avramov, et al. (2005) for example.
5 As GLM note, this is related to the fact that the conditional mean of a random variable is always 
smoother than the random variable itself.
6 A number of studies have examined the impact of serial correlation in returns on estimates of performance 
or risk exposures, see Dimson (1979), Geltner (1991, 1993), Asness, et al. (2001), Brooks and Kat (2001), 
Okunev and W hite (2002), Conner (2003) and Liew and French (2005). Earnings smoothing has also been 
extensively documented in the studies of accounting management, see Beidlerman (1973), Bannister and 
Newman (1996), Subramanyam (1996). See also Chandar and Bricker (2002) and Goel and Thakor (2003).
4
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influence their performance bonuses.
Building on the work of GLM, we exploit the link between autocorrelation in reported 
returns and exposure to illiquid assets to gain an insight into the time-varying liquidity 
of hedge fund returns by analyzing the time-varying nature of autocorrelation in hedge 
fund returns. Our analysis adds a time series dimension to the cross-sectional focus of 
GLM. GLM measure the illiquidity exposure as averages over the evaluation period, and 
these averages are taken “unconditionally” without regard to dynamic strategies hedge fund 
managers usually employ. Unlike traditional fund managers, the strategies of hedge funds 
are known to be dynamic, with fast turnover, involving both long and short positions, thus 
hedge funds usually have time-varying exposures to sources of risk. It is thus quite possible 
that the degree of illiquidity of hedge fund returns is also time-varying. By testing whether 
the degree of serial correlation (or liquidity) varies with certain variables we are able to draw 
some inferences as to the sources of this illiquidity. For example, how does the degree of 
illiquidity change with market returns or volatility, or with market-wide liquidity measures? 
By testing different candidates as the determinants of liquidity, we are able to produce a 
more complete picture of the sources of hedge fund (il) liquidity. Although the investments 
and strategies of individual hedge funds are closely-guarded secrets, we are able to indirectly 
capture the time-varying liquidity of their investments with our approach.
In a related paper, Bollen and Pool (2006) propose a method to distinguish between 
exposure to illiquid assets and intentional performance smoothing. Their approach is also 
based on allowing the serial correlation in hedge fund returns to vary through time. Given 
their tight focus on detecting fraudulent return smoothing, these authors only consider a 
single factor, namely whether the underlying “true” return on the fund is above or below some 
benchmark value. The inspiration for this factor stems from the insight that an unscrupulous 
hedge fund manager may report satisfactory returns more readily than losses, which generates 
time-varying serial correlation in reported returns. Our specification, described in Section 2, 
generalises that of Bollen and Pool to consider a wider variety of factors for time-varying 
liquidity in hedge fund returns. We also consider all funds in a style category jointly, which 
greatly increases the power of our method to detect significant liquidity factors.
5
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We follow GLM and assume that reported hedge fund returns are some weighted average 
of the current and past q lags of true returns on the fund. We allow for time variation 
in liquidity by allowing the weights on current and lagged true returns to vary over time: a 
greater weight on the current true return means that more of the true return is reflected in the 
reported return, consistent with greater liquidity. Conversely, a lower weight on the current 
true return implies lower liquidity and higher smoothing. The weights are specified as simple 
functions of a collection of natural candidate variables for a study of liquidity: stock market 
returns, volatility and liquidity (as proxied by the factor of P&stor and Stambaugh, 2003), 
bond market returns, volatility and liquidity (as proxied by bid-ask spreads on Treasury 
bonds), as well as other factors such as a calendar dummy variable and a variable that tracks 
net flows into the fund. We estimate our model using monthly hedge fund returns from 1993 
to 2004 from the CISDM database, and we find significant evidence of time variation in the 
liquidity of hedge fund returns for seven of the eight hedge fund styles considered. This is 
true whether we use a model with factors that are measured contemporaneously to fund 
returns, or a model where the factors are all lagged by one month. Somewhat surprisingly, 
our model using lagged factors, which may be used to predict future hedge fund liquidity, 
performs approximately as well as the model using contemporaneous factors. In a set of 
robustness checks, we show that our results hold for both live and “dead” funds, for funds 
that are open to new money or closed, and for audited versus non-audited funds.
For equity-based hedge fund strategies such as equity market neutral, equity hedge and 
non-hedge, liquidity decreases when stock market returns are low and bond market returns 
are high. For hedge fund strategies involving fixed income strategies, such as convertible, 
arbitrage and fixed income arbitrage, liquidity decreases when equity market volatility is 
high. Fund flow is also a significant determinant of liquidity of these hedge fund strategies, 
but the direction of the impact of fund flow on hedge fund liquidity varies across strategies. 
For merger arbitrage and distressed securities, smoothing also increases during the middle of 
the calendar year. Overall, while we do not find evidence suggesting that the degree of serial 
correlation in hedge fund returns is directly linked to deliberate performance smoothing for 
most hedge fund strategies, we do find that for fixed income arbitrage funds, smoothing
6
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increases when the “true” return is negative. These results significantly extend the existing 
literature, and help us to think about the sources of hedge fund (il)liquidity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss our econometric 
model of time-varying liquidity. We present our set of potential liquidity factors in Section 
3, and present our main empirical results in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the results of 
a simulation study of the finite-sample performance of our model for a variety of scenarios, 
and show that this performance is satisfactory for sample sizes relevant to our application. 
Section 6 concludes.
2 An econometric model of time-varying liquidity
As discussed in the Introduction, we implement our model of time-varying liquidity in hedge 
fund returns by exploiting a result of GLM: that hedge fund liquidity is inversely related to 
the degree of serial correlation in reported fund returns. To quantify the serial correlation in 
hedge fund returns, GLM assume that the fund z’s reported return, denoted r°t , is a weighted 
average of its unobserved true returns, denoted r^, over the most recent <7 +  1 periods:
T it =  @iQT'it +  1 +  ••• +  ^iq^it—q ( l )
where 1 =  9i0 +  On +  ... +  9iq
Thus observed returns follow an MA(q) process. The constraint that the weights sum to 
one implies that the information driving the fund’s performance in period t will eventually 
be fully reflected in observed returns, and this process could take up to q +  1 periods from 
the time the information is generated. The parameter 90 can be regarded as a proxy for the 
illiquidity exposure of hedge funds: lower values of 90 imply that less of the current true 
return is reflected in the current reported return.
GLM estimate the above model assuming that the weights (i.e. the parameters of the MA 
process) are constant, and their results may be interpreted as a measure of a hedge fund’s 
average illiquidity over the estimation period. To capture possible time variation of liquidity
7
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in hedge fund returns we propose allowing the parameters of the above model (0O, • ••, &q) to 
vary over time:
Vit =  OiOtTit +  +  ••• +  OiqtT i t -q (2 )
We assume that true returns are serially uncorrelated, in order to make the model well- 
identified, but we do not need to make any assumptions about cross-sectional correlation 
between the true returns on different funds, and we do not need to assume normality or 
homoskedasticity. We estimate our model via quasi-maximum likelihood.
most hedge funds, we are compelled to make the model as parsimonious as possible. As a
weights we effectively reduce the number of time-varying parameters to be modelled from 
q to just one, S a 8 Following GLM we set q =  2, so each reported return is a weighted 
average of the three most recent true returns. To see how S affects the weights on lagged
7We could, of course, parametrize the model as an autoregressive (AR) process rather than a moving 
average (MA) process. The main drawback of an AR specification is that it implies that any given true 
return takes an infinitely long time to be fully reflected in the reported returns, a feature that is at odds 
with the fact that most hedge funds are audited every twelve months. For this reason, we follow GLM and 
use a MA specification.
8We also estimated a fully-flexible MA(q) model on a sub-set of our funds, imposing no time variation 
in liquidity, and tested whether the geometric decay restriction was binding. The proportion of funds that 
rejected this restriction was in line with the size of the test, 5%, and so we concluded that this restriction is 
reasonable for our data.
In order to make the model empirically feasible given the limited histories available for
step in that direction, we constrain the coefficients on lagged true returns to be a function 
of a single liquidity “index” variable, denoted 5it, which completely determines the degree of 
liquidity of fund i at time t. The weights on the true returns are then constrained to decline 
geometrically towards zero, in a similar fashion to an autoregressive process7:
Oijt =  Oiot ■ sgn(Su) |<5it|J , j  =  1 , 2 , . . . , g (3)
where
where sgn(x)  =  x /  \x\ for x ^  0, and 0 for x =  0. By imposing geometric decay on the
8
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true returns see Figure 1: With 5 =  0 there is no smoothing: the contemporaneous true 
return gets weight equal to one, and all lagged returns get weights exactly equal to zero. For 
5 >  0 the weight on the contemporaneous true return decreases, and the weights on lagged 
returns increase. For 6 =  0.5 we see that the weight applied to the current true return 
is only about 0.6, indicating a substantial amount of smoothing. When S < 0 the weight 
applied to the contemporaneous true return is greater than one, and lagged returns have 
negative weights. This case corresponds to return ‘inflation’, whereby the current return is 
over-reported, and lagged returns are under-reported.
We specify the liquidity “index” variable, 8it, for fund i as a simple function of common 
liquidity factors, denoted X t , and fund-specific liquidity factors, denoted Z{t . Examples of 
the former include variables like stock or bond market volatility, while examples of the latter 
include net flows into fund i. We constrain 6lt to lie inside (—1,1) via the use of the modified 
logistic function, A : R —► (—1,1)
5« =  A(X,'Aj + Z'^i) (4)
X't\ i  =  Pi +  inXit  + ...'yiMX Mt (5)
~  +  ••• +  (/>ipZpt (6)
1 -  e~z
A (z) =  (7)
w  l  +  e-* v '
The model of GLM is obtained as a special case of our flexible model when =  ... =  
7 iM =  =  ••• =  $iP =  0. The model above has a total of 1 +  M  +  p  parameters per
hedge fund (not including the unconditional mean and variance parameters). Our initial 
model has 7 common liquidity factors and 2 fund-specific factors, implying 10 parameters 
per fund. With the limited time series available on each fund (the median sample size is 
46 months), this model is too heavily parameterised. One restriction that greatly enhances 
the information available for each parameter estimated is to impose that the liquidity factor 
coefficients are common across funds in a given style category. It would not be reasonable 
to assume that these parameters are constant across all the funds in our data set, but for
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funds within a given style this restriction is plausible. Thus we restrict j ik =  V i and 
4>u =  V i for all funds (i) in the same style category, for each factor (k, I). This model thus 
has “intercepts”, ft , that vary across funds but factor coefficients that are constant across 
funds in the same style category.
All but one of our liquidity factors are variables that are directly measurable from the 
data, such as aggregate market returns or net inflows to the fund. Our last factor is specified 
as the sign of the “true” return on the fund. This factor relies on having an estimate of 
the true return, which is itself a product of the estimation. Analogous to the estimation of 
the efficient weight matrix for GMM estimation, we overcome this problem by iteration: We 
first estimate the model with all desired factors except the sign of the true return. From 
that model we obtain the estimated true returns, and thus the signs of the estimated true 
returns. We use this variable as an extra factor in a second estimation of the model. From 
the second estimation we again obtain the estimated true returns, and we use those in 
the third estimation, repeating the procedure until the parameters converge. Convergence 
was usually obtained in three to five iterations9. In our “predictive” model for hedge fund 
liquidity, based on lagged factors, we do not include the sign of the “true” return as a factor, 
and so no iteration is needed in estimation.
Our use of the sign of the “true return” as a liquidity factor is similar to the Bollen and 
Pool (2006) model for return smoothing. Their model was specified as a regime-switching 
AR(1) process, where the AR(1) coefficient varied according to whether the factor model 
assumed to be generating the hedge fund returns was above or below some threshold. Our 
specification is clearly similar in spirit to the Bollen and Pool specification, though we feel 
that our approach has some key advantages. Firstly, we allow for a wide variety of factors 
to affect the liquidity of hedge fund returns. This is important as, amongst other reasons, 
it allows us to control for well-known sources of time-varying liquidity, such as time-varying 
aggregate market liquidity, before drawing inferences about other possible liquidity factors. 
Secondly, by focussing just on the sign of the true return, rather than the sign of the fund
9We use the sign of the true return, rather than the level of the true return, as the iterative procedure 
described above did not always converge when the true return itself was used as a factor. W hen the sign of 
the true return was used we did not find any problems attaining convergence.
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return in excess of some benchmark value, we avoid having to make any assumptions about 
the relevant factors for hedge fund returns (though of course we must do so for the factors 
affecting hedge fund liquidity). This is useful as there is no general consensus in the literature 
on an appropriate benchmark model for hedge fund returns. Finally, by imposing that the 
liquidity parameters are the same for all funds in a given style category our estimation 
procedure dramatically increases our power to detect significant liquidity factors. For seven 
out of eight styles considered we find evidence of time-varying liquidity that is significant 
at the 5% level (discussed in detail in Section 4). Bollen and Pool, on the other hand, 
detect significant time-varying serial correlation for only about 4% of their sample, which 
is approximately equal to the size of their tests (5%). This is likely due to their treatment 
of each fund separately, rather than pooling these funds by style category and gaining more 
precise estimates from cross-sectional data.
3 Description of the data and the liquidity factors
3.1 The determ inants o f tim e-varying liquidity
As determinants of time-varying hedge fund liquidity, we consider variables that are ex-ante 
likely to be related to aggregate market liquidity, such as market return, market volatility. 
A number of studies (see Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003 and Acharya and Pedersen, 2005 
for example) have documented that aggregate liquidity does change over time and liquidity 
tends to drop when the market is down and volatility is high. In liquid markets, “marking to 
market” will generally be possible, and the degree of serial correlation in hedge fund returns 
will be low. When hedge funds’ investments are illiquid, market prices are often not available 
and “fair values” will be determined by using a valuation model ( “marking to model”). The 
calculated “fair value” is a prediction rather than an observation, which induces smoothing 
even if done as accurately as possible. Moreover, as GLM suggest, intentional performance 
smoothing is easier when investments are illiquid because of the subjective decisions that 
have to be made when estimating the “fair value” of an investment. Hence, we also consider
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variables which are directly related to intentional performance smoothing, such as the time 
until the next fund audit for example.
M arket return: Asness et al. (2001) examine the relationship between hedge fund 
returns and lagged market returns separately for up and down markets. They find that 
coefficients on lagged negative market returns axe larger than coefficients on lagged positive 
market returns, suggesting that more smoothing occurs when market returns axe low. This 
could mean that fund managers deliberately smooth returns during market downturns, to 
reduce the reported losses, but do not smooth during market upturns. On the other hand, 
the results of Asness et al. may be a consequence of their choice of a single factor: hedge 
fund returns often display option-like properties, as shown by Fung and Hsieh (1997) for 
example, and apparent asymmetric factor exposures can occur when asset returns are more 
or less option-like than the chosen factors, see Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986). Another 
explanation, unrelated to intentional smoothing, is that aggregate market liquidity generally 
decreases during market downturns10, making it harder for managers to mark-to-market, 
thus inducing greater smoothing in downturns than upturns. We will include proxies directly 
aimed at controlling for aggregate market liquidity, see below, and thus we isolate the impact 
of market returns on hedge fund liquidity separately from aggregate market liquidity.
We use the return on the S&P 500 index as the proxy for equity market returns and the 
return of Lehman Brothers aggregate bond index return as the proxy for bond market returns. 
The Lehman Brothers index covers government securities, mortgage-backed securities., asset- 
backed securities and corporate securities to simulate the universe of bonds in the market. 
The maturity of the bonds in the index are all greater than one year.
M arket vo latility : The well-known positive relation between volatility and volume 
suggests that in more volatile markets we expect to see more assets being marked to market, 
rather than marked to model, and thus less smoothing. However, when volatility is high, 
liquidity is usually low, see Pdstor and Stambaugh (2003) and Chordia, et al. (2005) for 
example. Therefore, high market volatility may lead to less market-wide liquidity, and thus
10See Chordia, et al. (2005) for example. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2006) provide one theoretical 
explanation as to why liquidity may “dry up” more often when markets decline.
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more smoothing in hedge fund returns. As proxies for market volatility, we follow French, 
Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) and estimate monthly stock and bond market volatility as
Nt N t - l
° 2t =  Y j l  +  2 ritri+1,t (8)
z=l i= 1
\
where rit is the daily return on the S&P 500 or Lehman Brothers bond index on day i in 
month £, and Nt is the number of trading days in month t.
M ark et-w ide liquidity: The markets in which hedge funds trade also go through pe­
riods of high and low liquidity (see footnote 2 for references). Fluctuations in aggregate 
market liquidity will almost mechanically induce time-varying liquidity in hedge fund re­
turns. Further, periods of low market liquidity correspond to periods when managers can 
exercise greater discretion in marking-to-model, thus perhaps inducing even larger fluctua­
tions in liquidity than in the underlying markets. Both of these observations imply that it is 
important to control for market-wide liquidity before attempting to infer a relation between 
hedge fund liquidity and other factors.
Our stock market liquidity measure is the Pdstor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity index 
from CRSP database. Their monthly measure of aggregate stock market liquidity is a cross- 
sectional average of individual stock liquidity measures estimated using daily data, which 
is based on the principle that lower liquidity corresponds to greater volume-related return 
reversals. The rationale behind this measure is consistent with the model and empirical 
evidence presented by Campbell, et al. (1993); see also Avramov, et al. (2005). These 
authors find that returns accompanied by high volume tend to be reversed more strongly, 
and they explain how this result is consistent with a model in which some investors axe 
compensated for accommodating the liquidity demands of others.
Fleming (2003) reports that the quoted spread is the best measure for monitoring Trea­
sury bond liquidity, and Goldreich, et al. (2005) suggest that quoted spreads are a better 
measure of liquidity risk in bond market than effective spreads. We follow these papers 
estimate bond market liquidity using quoted bid and ask prices available from the CRSP 
Treasury Quotes file. This measure is also used by Goyenko (2005).
13
16 o f  128
Fund flows: Fund flows directly affect the hedge fund managers’ income because man­
agerial fees are dependent on the size of the fund. Flows, of course, also impact the hedge 
fund manager’s ability to take on positions: capital out-flows force the fund manager to 
liquidate his positions, thus leading to more marking to market and less smoothing of re­
turns. On the other hand, if a fund manager expects more fund outflows following poor past 
performance, then in order to reduce outflows he may be more inclined to smooth reported 
returns.
We compute the percentage net fund flow in month t  as the difference between the growth 
in the total net asset value of the fund and the reported return on the fund. In our first 
model, we use a forward-looking three month moving average of fund flow as our proxy 
for fund flows since the date of an out-flow will be known in advance due to redemption 
notification rules, whereas an in-flow to a fund may or may not be anticipated. In our 
“predictive” model for hedge fund liquidity we simply use the net fund flow for the previous 
month.
T h e sign  o f  “tru e” return: When “true” returns are positive, part of the gains/losses 
earned in a given month may not be reported so as to off-set future losses/gains, thus 
smoothing increases. The SEC (2004) emphasized that valuation problems often arise “when 
hedge fund advisers overstate assets in order to cover trading losses.” On the other hand, 
it is also possible that low/negative returns on the fund lead to more redemptions, which 
induces unwinding of positions, enabling mar king- to-market, which improves liquidity.
T h e tim e  un til th e  n ex t fund a u d it/ca len d a r  effects: If hedge fund auditors 
provide independent confirmation of annual returns, then any intentional smoothing that 
takes place during the financial year must be “unwound” by the year-end. If hedge fund 
managers were intentionally smoothing their reported returns, then it would be easiest to 
do so in the months furthest from an audit date. Unfortunately, the dates of fund audits is 
not generally publicly available, although Liang (2003) reports that hedge funds are usually 
audited in December, and Agarwal, et al. (2006) note that bonuses are paid in December11.
n Herzberg and Mozes (2003) and Agarwal, et al. (2006) find that hedge fund returns, as opposed to serial 
correlation in these returns, are not equally distributed across calendar months: on average hedge funds 
report returns in December that are much larger than other months during the year. Agarwal, et al. (2006)
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Thus our measure of the time until the next fund audit is a general “calendar effect” variable, 
and any seasonal pattern in hedge fund liquidity could also come from a seasonal pattern 
in aggregate market liquidity. A significant such pattern in U.S. equities is reported by 
Chordia, et al. (2005) and Hong and Yu (2005). To capture seasonal pattern in hedge fund 
liquidity, we define the time dummy equal to zero from April to September, one in the rest 
of the months of the year.
3.2 Description of the hedge fund returns data
We use monthly returns and accompanying information on both live and “dead” individual 
hedge funds from January 1993 to August 2004 from the CISDM database. This data­
base provides monthly observations of returns, total net assets, and net asset values, and 
a fund information file, containing fund name, strategy type, management fees, and other 
supplementary details. We analyze 8 fund strategies, namely Merger Arbitrage, Distressed 
Securities, Equity Hedge, Equity Nonhedge, Market Neutral, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Con­
vertible Arbitrage, Global Macro. Due to the data-intensive nature of the research question, 
we only study funds with at least 48 months of observations, which leaves us with a total of 
609 individual hedge funds.
In Table 1 we provide summary statistics on the hedge fund returns over our sample 
period. For each strategy, the table lists the number of funds and means and standard de­
viations of basic summary statistics and the smoothing profiles estimated using the GLM 
MA(2) smoothing process. Consistent with GLM, merger arbitrage, distressed securities, 
convertible arbitrage and fixed income have relatively high average serial correlations and 
the estimated smoothing parameter 0o is low on average. Market neutral, equity hedge, 
equity nonhedge, global macro funds which mainly invest in liquid assets exhibit low se­
rial correlation and 6q is relatively close to unity. Panel A in Table 2 contains summary 
statistics of our liquidity factors over the sample period. Panel B in Table 2 reports pair­
wise correlation among the various determinants, and shows that none have excessively high
argue that this is because fund managers engage in managing their returns towards the end of the year in 
order to earn greater incentive fees.
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correlation.
4 Empirical evidence of time-varying hedge fund liq­
uidity
We present our results in two formats. The first set of results, in Table 3, includes all of the 
factors discussed in the previous section. The results in this table allow us to examine the im­
pact of a given factor, controlling for the influence of other factors that are possibly relevant 
for hedge fund liquidity. The cost of including these extra variables is the generally decreased 
significance of any given individual factor. However, the fact that our model controls for the 
influence of other relevant variables is an important advantage of our approach.
In Table 4 we report the model resulting from a general-to-simple specification search, 
where we started with the most general model, and then dropped the factor with the lowest 
t-statistic and re-estimated the reduced model. We continued eliminating variables, one at 
a time, until all the factors left in the model were significant at 10% level12. By excluding 
variables which are not statistically significant we parsimoniously extract factors that are 
significant determinants the liquidity in hedge fund returns13. All standard errors reported 
in this paper are Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors.
Our initial model imposed that the coefficients on the liquidity factors were common 
across funds in the same style category, but allowed the “intercepts” (ft in equation 5), 
or unconditional levels of serial correlation, to vary across each fund in a given style. We 
tested the additional restriction that the intercept parameters were equal across funds in 
the same style category and found that this restriction was not rejected for any of the styles 
we consider. Thus the results we report are from the simplified model with the intercepts 
imposed to be constant across funds in the same style category.
12 Some detailed discussion of the general to simple model selection procedure can be found in Hendry and 
Richard (1982, 1983) and Hoover and Perez (1999).
13 Interestingly, the parameter estimates and t-statistics in the reduced model are not very different from 
those in the most general model except for equity nonhedge funds, where some insignificant factors in the 
general model turn out to be significant in the reduced model.
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Before discussing the results for particular hedge fund styles, let us firstly describe the 
results in general. Tables 3 and 4 reveal quite clearly that stock market returns and volatility 
are important determinants of hedge fund liquidity. The influence of these factors is not 
merely due to them proxying for market liquidity, since the models reported in Table 3 include 
controls for stock and bond market liquidity. For five out of the eight styles considered we 
find stock market returns or volatility to be significant determinants of hedge fund liquidity. 
The return on the bond index is also an important variable, being significant for three styles. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the stock market liquidity proxy is not significant for any style (in 
the general model; it is significant in one of the reduced models) and the bond market 
liquidity proxy is only significant for one style. This suggests that while these proxies track 
liquidity in the stock or bond markets well, they are not as good at tracking time-varying 
liquidity in hedge fund returns. The only remaining variable that was often significant 
across styles is the fund flows variable: this variable was significant in four out of the eight 
styles. Interestingly, the sign of this variable was not consistent across styles: for Merger 
and Convertible Arbitrage styles the sign was negative, indicating that net in-flows lead to 
higher liquidity, whereas for the Fixed Income and Global Macro styles the sign was positive, 
indicating that net out-fl.ows lead to higher liquidity.
To glean some further insight from our models, in Figures 2 and 3 we plot the time 
series of 6ot , estimated from the general model, for each hedge fund style. For comparison 
purposes, we also plot the GLM estimate of Oq for each style and a 95% confidence interval 
for this estimate. These figures clearly show that the liquidity of hedge fund investments 
varies significantly over time across all fund styles. Consistent with conventional wisdom 
that the assets of equity-based funds are more liquid, the general level of #ot of equity-based 
styles is nearer to unity than those of non-equity based styles. However, by allowing 0O to 
vary through time important variations in liquidity are found even for funds that have an 
average 6q (the “GLM 0O”) that is near unity. For example, the Equity non-hedge style both 
has an average 0o very near one, whereas the time-varying estimates show that Oq for this 
styles varies from as low as 0.5 (indicating substantial return smoothing) up to as high as 
2.5 (indicating return “inflation”).
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Interestingly, our model detects a large drop in liquidity around September 1998 in all 
fund styles except Global macro. This period corresponds to the time of the Russian debt 
crisis and the collapse of LTCM, a period widely-thought to have been one of low aggregate 
liquidity, see Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2006) for ex­
ample. Another large downward spike in our measure of liquidity occurs around July 2002, 
particularly for the Merger arbitrage, Distressed securities and Convertible arbitrage styles. 
This corresponds roughly to the outbreak of now-infamous accounting scandals (Enron, 
Arthur Andersen, Adelphia, and WorldCom). In the plots of Merger arbitrage and Dis­
tressed securities funds, time-varying 90t also exhibits a strong calendar effect, with liquidity 
falling in the middle of the calendar year and rising around the end of the year.
4.1 R esults for individual hedge fund styles
D eterm in an ts o f  liq u id ity  in m arket neutral fund returns: Managers of market 
neutral funds purchase undervalued securities and short sell overvalued securities so as to 
neutralize the impact of the overall market. This strategy is regarded as a “zero beta” 
strategy because the whole portfolio is supposed to have no, or at least low, co-movement 
with the overall market, although Patton (2005) reports some evidence against this. We find 
just two significant determinants of liquidity in market neutral fund returns: stock market 
returns and bond market returns. These factors are significant in the general model and 
are the only two factors that appear in the reduced model. The general model is significant 
overall, with a joint test of the hypothesis that all factors have coefficients equal to zero 
being rejected with a p-value of 0.02. We find that stock market returns are positively re­
lated to market neutral hedge fund liquidity even after controlling for market liquidity. This 
finding is consistent with the results of Asness et al. (2001), who find that coefficients on 
lagged negative market returns are larger than coefficients on lagged positive market returns, 
implying greater smoothing during market downturns. This may be due to managers’ inten­
tional performance smoothing during market downturns. However we do not find the sign 
of “true” return is a significant determinant of the degree of liquidity, which would seem a
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more relevant indicator of intentional performance smoothing. Further, we find that bond 
returns have a negative influence on hedge fund liquidity, in that high bond market returns 
lead to lower liquidity, which is hard to reconcile with an intentional performance smoothing 
explanation.
D eterm in an ts o f  liq u id ity  in eq u ity  hedge fund returns: Like equity market 
neutral funds, equity hedge fund investments also combine holdings of long equities with 
short sales of stocks and/or stock index options. The difference from market neutral funds 
is equity hedge fund managers do not aim for a zero beta. They usually increase net long 
exposures in bull markets and decrease net long exposures or even are net short in bear 
markets. Similar to equity market neutral funds, we find a positive (negative) relation 
between stock (bond) market return and the degree of liquidity in equity hedge fund returns. 
The joint significance of time variation in liquidity is again strong, with a p-value of less than 
0 .01.
D eterm in an ts o f  liq u id ity  in equ ity  non h ed ge fund returns: Equity nonhedge 
funds are commonly known as “stock-pickers” because these funds are predominately long 
in equities. The important distinction between equity non-hedge funds and equity hedge 
funds is equity non-hedge funds do not always have a hedge in place. Similar to equity 
hedge funds and market neutral, we find that stock market returns are positively related 
to the liquidity in equity nonhedge fund returns. However, instead of bond return as a 
significant determinant of liquidity, we find there is a negative relationship between stock 
market liquidity and the liquidity in equity nonhedge fund returns. This is the only style 
category in which the aggregate stock market liquidity proxy was significant, and it is only 
significant in the reduced model; in the aggregate model the coefficient on this variable has 
a t-statistic of only 1.21. Overall, however, the general model for time-varying liquidity is 
very significant, with a p-value from a joint test of constant liquidity being less than 0.01.
D eterm in an ts o f  liqu id ity  in global m acro fund returns: Global macro funds aim 
to profit from changes in macroeconomies, and participate in equities, bonds, currencies and 
commodities markets. For this style, we found bond market returns to be positively related 
to the degree of liquidity in global macro fund returns, indicating lower liquidity for these
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funds when the bond market is falling. The only other significant factor for this style was 
the fund flow. This factor has a positive coefficient, indicating that net out-fiows (meaning 
the “net fund flow” variable takes a negative value) increase the liquidity of the fund. This 
finding is consistent with the scenario where out-flows cause the fund to liquidate some of 
their positions, which enables marking to market and thus greater liquidity. The global 
macro style is the only category where the general model for time-varying liquidity could 
not reject the null of constant liquidity; the p-value for this test is 0.15.
D eterm in an ts o f  liq u id ity  in m erger arbitrage fund returns: Contrary to previous 
four strategies, the merger arbitrage strategy usually involves less liquid assets. Merger 
arbitrage funds take bets in event-driven situations such as mergers, takeovers, corporate 
restructuring, spin-offs. In the general model we find only one significant factor: net fund 
flows. The sign of this coefficient is negative, indicating that net out-flows decrease liquidity. 
This finding is not consistent with the scenario where out-flows cause the fund to liquidate 
some of their positions, enabling marking to market. Instead, the sign of this coefficient is 
consistent with the scenario where a hedge fund manager experiencing net fund out-flows 
increases the degree of intentional performance smoothing, thus decreasing our estimate of 
liquidity14.
D eterm in an ts o f  liq u id ity  in d istressed  secu rities fund returns: This type of fund 
usually focusses on companies which have been, or are expected to be, in financial difficulties. 
Investments may be made in bonds, stocks, bank debt, corporate debt, trade claims and/or 
warrants. Distressed securities are often illiquid and it is not always possible to mark them 
to market. In contrast to our results for market neutral and equity hedge funds, we find that 
stock market volatility shows a significant negative relation with liquidity, suggesting that 
when the stock market is volatile the liquidity of these funds is lower. We also find bond
14In the reduced model we also find that the calendar dummy is significant and positive, indicating 
that liquidity is significantly lower in the April-September period than the October-March period. This 
is consistent with the hypothesis that it is easier for hedge fund managers to intentionally “smooth” their 
reported returns in the months furthest from an audit date, i.e., in the middle of the calendar year. However 
it is important to note that this variable is not significant in the general model, where we control for many 
other relevant variables. If aggregate market liquidity is also seasonal, as found by Chordia, et al. (2005) 
and Hong and Yu (2005), then by omitting it as a control variable we may spuriously find seasonality in 
hedge fund liquidity.
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market return is positively related to distressed securities fund liquidity, though only in the 
reduced model.
D eterm in an ts o f  liq u id ity  in  convertib le  arbitrage fund returns: Convertible 
arbitrage strategies attempt to take advantage of relative pricing discrepancies between the 
theoretical and market prices of convertible bonds. If a convertible bond appears to be 
undervalued, then the manager may take a long position in the convertible bond and short 
the company’s equity to reduce the exposure to equity risk. For these funds we again find 
that higher stock market volatility leads to lower liquidity of these funds’ investments. We 
also find our aggregate bond market liquidity proxy to be significant, and of the expected 
sign: lower bond market liquidity leads to lower hedge fund liquidity. Finally, we also found 
that the net fund flows are a significant factor for these funds. The sign of the coefficient 
is negative, again suggesting that net fund out-flows decrease the liquidity of the fund’s 
investments.
D eterm in an ts o f  liq u id ity  in  fixed  incom e fund returns: This strategy attempts 
to exploit mis-pricing among fixed income securities while neutralizing exposure to interest 
rate risk. The restriction of constant liquidity is most strongly rejected for this style of 
hedge funds: the test statistic is 53.16, compared with the critical value of 16.92 at the 
0.05 level. As in convertible arbitrage funds, we find liquidity is lower when stock market 
volatility is high. Particular to fixed income arbitrage funds, the sign of “true” return shows 
a significant positive relation with liquidity. This is consistent with a scenario where the 
hedge fund manager intentionally smooths negative returns, while more honestly reports 
positive returns. It is this type of pattern in hedge fund returns that Bollen and Pool (2006) 
sought to detect as a potential indicator of fraudulent reporting.
Sum m ary o f  th e  d eterm in an ts o f  tim e-varyin g  liq u id ity  in hedge fund returns: 
Overall, we find substantial evidence of time variation in the amount of smoothing in hedge 
fund returns. For all but one of the eight style categories studied we were able to reject 
the null of constant liquidity at the 0.05 level. For equity-based hedge fund strategies, 
such as equity market neutral, equity hedge and non-hedge, which usually invest in liquid 
securities and exhibit low serial correlation in their returns, liquidity decreases when stock
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market returns axe low and bond market returns are high. For strategies focussed more on 
fixed income markets, such as convertible arbitrage and fixed income hedge funds, liquidity 
decreases when equity market volatility is high. Fund flow is also a significant determinant 
of liquidity of these less liquid hedge fund strategies. Overall, we do not find evidence of 
deliberate performance smoothing for most hedge fund strategies, but we do find that for 
fixed income arbitrage funds, smoothing increases when the “true” return is negative.
4.2 Predicting hedge fund liquidity
Our results above strongly suggest that the liquidity of hedge fund investments is time- 
varying, and that this variation can be at least partially captured using contemporaneous 
values of such factors as equity market returns and volatility, bond market returns and 
net fund flows. A natural follow-up question to ask is whether we can predict hedge fund 
liquidity using these factors. We investigate this question by estimating the same model but 
using one-month lags of our predictor variables15. We drop the “true return” factor from 
this specification, and we use simply the one-month lag of net fund flows, rather than a 
(forward-looking) three-month average of net fund flows. The results of this specification 
axe presented in Table 4.
The results from this predictive model axe broadly consistent with the “contemporaneous” 
model discussed in the previous section. Seven out of eight styles again exhibit significant 
time variation in liquidity, although it is the Equity non-hedge style that has no significantly 
predictable liquidity, whereas in the contemporaneous model it was the Global macro style 
that appeared to have constant liquidity. For the remaining styles the predictability of fund 
liquidity is strongly significant: for the Market neutral style the p-value on the test for no 
predictability is 0.01, while for the remaining styles they are less than 0.001. Thus hedge 
fund liquidity appears to be both significantly time-varying, and significantly predictable.
Two main features of the results for the predictive model of hedge fund liquidity stand 
out. Firstly, the one-month lagged return on the S&P 500 index is a strongly significant
15 This is in the spirit of the “direct” forecasting approach as opposed to the “iterated” approach, which 
was found by Marcellino, Stock and Watson (2006) to be preferable for forecasting macroeconomic variables.
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factor for predicting hedge fund liquidity for seven out of the eight styles. In all cases, the 
sign of the coefficient on the S&;P 500 return is negative, implying that falls in the stock 
market are followed by decreases in fund liquidity. This is the most consistent result of all 
the factors, including in the contemporaneous factors. The second prominent finding is for 
the Pastor-Stambaugh equity liquidity index, which is significant for three styles (Distressed 
securities, Convertible arbitrage, and Fixed income) and has in all three cases a negative 
sign, indicated that falls in aggregate liquidity predict falls in fund liquidity the following 
month.
4.3 R obustness checks
In this section we investigate the robustness of the above findings to hedge fund character­
istics beyond stated investment styles. We consider sorting funds by whether they were still 
reporting to the database as at the end of our sample period or not ( “live” versus “dead” 
funds), whether they were accepting new money at the end of our sample period or not 
( “open” or “closed”), and whether they had been audited by the end of our sample period.
“L ive” versus “d ead ” funds: We consider this split of the funds to determine whether 
we can reasonably pool “dead” funds with live funds, the latter of course being of primary 
interest to investors and regulators, to gain more precise parameter estimators. There were 
361 funds still reporting at the end of our sample period, leaving 248 “dead” funds. We 
estimated our model on each of these two groups of funds, and report the results in the first 
two columns of Table 6. For both of these groups of funds we find the bond market return to 
be the only significant liquidity factor. It has a positive coefficient, as it did for the market 
neutral, equity hedge and global macro fund styles, presented in Table 3, indicating that 
higher bond market returns are associated with lower hedge fund liquidity. Furthermore, 
the factor coefficient estimates for both of these groups of hedge funds are very similar. 
These results suggest that the time-varying properties of fund liquidity are not substantially 
different for live and dead funds.
“O pen” versus “closed ” funds: One might reasonably think that the incentives facing
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a hedge fund manager who is not accepting new money are different to those facing a manager 
who is still accepting new money into his/her fund. Most relevant to this study, the incentives 
to intentionally smooth returns are presumably greater for managers still looking to increase 
the size of their fund than those who have closed the fund to new money. There were 308 live 
funds still open to new money at the end of our sample period, 48 funds were closed to new 
money, while for five funds we had no information on whether they were still accepting new 
money or not. We excluded these five funds from this analysis. The estimation results are 
presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 6. For both of these groups of funds we 
again find the bond market return to be the only significant liquidity factor: it has a positive 
coefficient, indicating that higher bond market returns are associated with lower liquidity 
for both open and closed funds. We also again find that the coefficient estimates are very 
similar across these two groups of funds, and so we conclude that the liquidity properties of 
open and closed funds are not substantially different.
N o n -a u d ited  funds: If the autocorrelation in reported hedge fund returns was primarily 
due to intentional return smoothing, rather than just a side-effect of investment illiquidity, 
then one may expect the model results to differ between funds that had been subject to 
an audit and those that had not. Almost all of the funds in our database were audited: 
only 20 out of 609 were not. Of these, 13 were live funds and 7 were dead funds. We 
estimated our model on the non-audited funds, but it was not feasible computationally to 
estimate the model on all 589 audited funds jointly. Thus we compare the results for the 
non-audited funds, presented in the final column of Table 6, with those for the live and dead 
funds presented in the first two columns. None of the factors for the non-audited funds were 
significant at the 5% or 10% level, however the model overall had a p-value of 0.06, and 
so is significant at the 10% level. This slightly reduced significance may be attributable to 
the fact that there are only 20 funds in this category, and so the amount of cross-sectional 
information available is limited. The individual coefficient estimates are comparable to those 
for live and dead funds as a whole, and thus we conclude that non-audited funds are not 
substantially different from the rest of the funds in our database, and need not be excluded
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from the pooled estimation of the model.
5 A simulation study
With the relatively short samples of hedge fund returns available, and the somewhat com­
plicated nature of our model, it is important to verify that the properties of our estimator 
are satisfactory for realistic sample sizes. We do this via a small simulation study of our 
model for a range of realistic scenarios. We are primarily concerned with the finite-sample 
size of the test, that is, the proportion of times a true null hypothesis is rejected. The null 
hypotheses of interest in our paper relate to the individual and joint significance of factors 
for the time-varying liquidity of hedge fund investments.
With this in mind, we simulate from a simple model for hedge fund returns where the 
liquidity is constant, and then estimate our model which allows for time-varying hedge fund 
liquidity and test for the significance of the factors in the model. Ideally, the proportion of 
times that a factor is found to be significant should roughly equal the nominal size of the 
test, which will be set at 0.05 throughout. The data generating process for the hedge fund 
returns and the liquidity “factors” is:
r°t =  (1 -  On -  0i2) r it +  9{ +  0i2r<|t_2, t =  1 ,2 ,..., T\ i =  1 ,2 ,..., K
Tit
~  iid  N  1 Mi 1
Of 0'N
ft V 0
----1
£o
1
where In is an identity matrix of dimension N  and On is a (TV x  1) vector of zeros. Thus we 
assume that the true returns on hedge fund i, ru, are iid  N  (^ , o f ) . The reported returns, 
r°t , axe then generated as a linear combination of the three most recent true returns, following 
the model of GLM. We specified the values for (/^, of, On, 0i2) from estimates of a MA(2) 
model on a randomly selected subset of our funds. The liquidity “factors” were set as simple 
iid  standard Normal variables. As the factors in this simulation are iid  and independent 
of the true return, the results of this simulation can be used to justify both specifications
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(contemporaneous and predictive) of our model.
An important empirical feature of our data is the unbalanced nature of our panel of hedge 
fund returns. By using both live and dead funds in our analysis we are forced to deal with 
the fact that some funds drop out of our sample before the last period, and many funds were 
not present in the first period. In order to replicate this feature of the data in our simulation 
we randomly selected fifty (the largest value of K  we considered in the simulation) funds 
from our sample and recorded the dates of each fund’s first and last observation, t{ irst and 
fj'P'St_ pYom these, we computed
J .f ir s t  . la st
_ f i r s t  Li _ la st LiT • =  ------- T • =  -----% r p  5 % r p
which reflect the proportions of each sample that were missing from the start and end of the 
sample for fund i. These are helpful when considering various values of T; if we instead just 
matched the values of ( t { irst, then for large T  the impact of missing data would go to 
zero. To replicate the missing data in our simulation we used these values of ( r { irst, rjast  ^ , 
i =  1,2, ...,50 to determine which observations we should “throw away”. In the tables 
below we report the results both with and without the missing observations imposed on the 
simulated data.
The key design parameters in this simulation are the sample size, T, the number of funds 
in the category, K , and the number of factors, N. Our application involved sample sizes 
of between 48 and 140, style categories containing between 20 and 121 funds, and a set of 
factors ranging from 2 to 8. With this in mind, we used the following: T  =  75, 150, 500; 
K  =  1, 10, 50; N  =  1, 4, 8. Ideally we would have also ran the simulation for larger values 
of K  but this was not computationally feasible, given that we need to replicate each scenario 
hundreds of times to get precise estimates of the finite-sample rejection frequencies. Even 
this small simulation study was quite computationally burdensome16.
The largest value of T  we consider is much larger than our longest time series, but
16This simulation took approximately 2520 hours (over 100 days) on a Pentium 2.8GHz machine, for 300 
replications.
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we include this value as a check on the quality of the asymptotic approximation: if the 
finite-sample rejection frequencies are substantially different from their nominal levels when 
T  =  500 then this may indicate a problem with the assumptions underlying the asymptotic 
theory. Unsurprisingly, we find that the T  =  500 scenario leads to satisfactory results in 
almost all cases.
We present the results for two scenarios: one where there were no missing observations 
and where the sign of the “true” return is not included as a factor, and a scenario where we 
imposed some missing observations (described above) and included the sign of the “true” 
return as a factor17. We considered the case with and without the “true return” factor as 
this factor requires an iterative estimation procedure, whereas the other factor coefficients 
can be estimated as usual via maximum likelihood. It turned out that the coefficient on the 
“true return” factor was well-estimated using our iterative procedure.
In Table 7 we present the proportion of times that  ^ single factor was found to have a 
coefficient significant at the 0.05  level. Since the true coefficients on all factors in the simu­
lation are zero, these proportions should be approximately equal to 0.05 . This is generally 
what we find. The worst results are obtained when only a single fund is included in the panel 
(K  =  1), and when the number of factors considered is large (N  =  4,8). Most importantly 
for our study, the results for the scenarios with T  =  7 5 ,1 5 0  with K  =  50 and N  — 4 ,8 are 
close to the nominal size of 0.05. Thus we can be reasonably confident that our t-tests have 
satisfactory finite sample properties.
In Table 8 we present the proportion of times that we could reject the null hypothesis that 
all factors have coefficients equal to zero. These results are worse than the individual t-test 
results, particularly when K  =  1 and N  =  4 ,8. However, the scenarios with T  —  7 5 ,1 5 0  
with K  =  50 and N  =  4,8, which are the most relevant for our study, are reasonably close 
to the nominal size of 0 .05 . The tendency for this joint test to slightly over-reject the null 
hypothesis suggests that we should be careful interpreting results where the rejection of the
17In unreported results (available from the authors upon request) we also considered the two other cases, 
involving missing observations but without the “true return” factor, or involving no missing observations 
and including the “true return” factor. The bulk of the differences between the two cases presented here 
is attributable to the creation of missing observations; the impact of including the “true return” factor is 
minimal.
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null is “borderline” . We rejected the null of constant liquidity for seven of our eight styles, 
and for six of the eight styles the p-value was less than 0.001. For the market neutral style 
the p-value was 0.022, and so these simulation result may indicate that the evidence against 
constant liquidity is slightly weaker for this style than the asymptotic theory would suggest.
Overall, we conclude from this simulation study that our econometric approach has rea­
sonable properties in finite samples, particularly when the funds are “pooled” together and 
treated jointly. With longer samples (T  =  500) our simulation results suggest that it is feasi­
ble to treat each fund separately, thus allowing greater flexibility in modelling time-varying 
liquidity, but for the sample sizes currently available (T =  75,150) pooling of funds is a 
simple way of improving the accuracy of the tests.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we proposed a method to identify and analyze the key determinants of hedge 
fund liquidity. Our approach does not require information on the actual positions taken by 
the hedge fund, rather we use only the monthly returns reported by the hedge fund and other 
easily observed information. We find substantial evidence of time variation in the liquidity 
of hedge fund returns, and this variation can be predicted with readily available data. Hedge 
funds in equity-based styles, such as equity market neutral and equity hedge or non-hedge, 
exhibit decreases in liquidity when stock market returns axe low and bond market returns 
are high. In contrast, hedge funds in fixed income styles, such as convertible arbitrage or 
fixed income arbitrage, exhibit lower liquidity when equity market volatility is high, and 
when the fund experiences in-flows or out-flows of funds.
Our methodology and empirical findings on the key determinants of hedge fund liquidity 
have important implications for investors in and regulators of hedge funds. It is usually very 
difficult for hedge fund investors to closely monitor liquidity risk of hedge funds, since the 
risk exposure of hedge funds can change dramatically in response to market conditions. Our 
methodology provides an alternative means for investors to capture time-varying liquidity of 
hedge fund investments. It is also useful for regulators to monitor potential market liquidity
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risk resulting from the opacity of hedge funds’ investments. While direct regulation of hedge 
fund positions would require comprehensive (and sensitive) information, our approach offers 
a convenient (and less controversial), way to estimate the liquidity of hedge fund investments 
since only the reported returns on the fund and other currently available data.
The identification of key determinants of hedge fund liquidity also sheds some light on 
the issue of evaluation of hedge fund assets. The accurate and impartial valuation of hedge 
fund assets has become an increasingly important issue in the hedge fund industry18. Our 
results indicate that especially for some hedge fund strategies involving particularly illiquid 
assets, such as the fixed income style, a consistent valuation standard or an independent 
administrator appointed to carry out the valuation may be needed.
Whilst our results shed new light on the factors that are correlated with the liquidity 
of hedge fund investments, our reduced-form econometric model is not able to definitively 
separate the possible causes of these observed correlations. For example, equity market 
returns were found to be an important factor for several of the style categories we considered, 
and we found that periods of low equity returns correspond to periods of low hedge fund 
liquidity. One scenario that would generate such a correlation is if funds find it harder to 
mark to market in falling markets. In that case, falling markets correspond to times when 
funds rely more heavily on “marking to model” , which is revealed as lower liquidity in our 
approach. Another, less benign, scenario is one where the incentives to intentionally smooth 
reported returns lead fund managers to indulge in this practice more often in falling markets. 
Separating these two scenarios requires a theoretical model with careful descriptions of the 
preferences and incentives faced by the relevant agents: managers, investors, and regulators. 
Our empirical results will be useful in checking the realism of the predictions from this type 
of model, but we leave the development such a model to future research.
18 Whether the significant autocorrelation in hedge fund returns is due to hedge funds’ systematic illiquidity 
exposure or managers’ intentional performance smoothing is directly related to the question whether the 
valuations of hedge fund assets are accurate and impartial. The answer to this question is of particular 
importance to regulators and was the central topic of a speech given by the United Kingdom Financial 
Service Authority’s asset management sector head (Dan Waters) at a conference in March 2006. He noted 
that “In 2005, valuation related losses in hedge funds were estimated to total S i.6 billion. Poor valuation 
procedures in combination with weak internal controls were in some cases exploited to misrepresent hedge 
fund valuations and commit fraud.”
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Table 1
Summary statistics for hedge fund returns
T his tab le  presen ts cross-sectional m eans an d  s tan d a rd  deviations of basic sum m ary  s ta tis tic s  for funds in th e  CISD M  d a tab ase  
over th e  sam ple period  Jan u a ry  1993 to  A ugust 2004. K  is th e  num ber of funds. SD denotes s ta n d a rd  deviations. As in  GLM , 
#0 is th e  es tim ated  sm ooth ing  p a ram ete r of th e  M A(2) sm ooth ing  process r °  =  6qr t +  0 \ r t - \  +  ^ 2 H - 2 j  w here r °  is th e  observed 
re tu rn  on th e  fund, su b jec t to  th e  norm aliza tion  1 =  6q +  6\  +  62, and  estim ated  v ia  m axim um  likelihood. p x%  an d  p 2%  deno te 
first o rder an d  second order au toco rre la tion  respectively.
C ategory K M ean SD Skewness K urtosis p i% p 2%
M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD
M kt n eu tra l 121 0.96 0.57 3.88 2.98 0.44 1.19 6.57 5.70 0.88 0.24 13.85 17.72 7.54 15.27
E q  hedge 58 0.99 0.84 5.18 2.74 0.01 1.10 6.40 4.85 0.92 0.37 13.99 16.23 6.88 14.16
E q  nonhedge 20 1.24 0.82 8.25 4.69 0.17 0.69 4.86 1.88 0.97 0.18 6.97 13.16 -0.01 11.30
G lobal m acro 90 0.96 0.81 5.30 3.54 0.28 0.97 5.60 4.40 0.97 0.27 9.51 16.81 1.98 15.14
D istressed 72 1.08 0.59 3.82 3.01 -0.14 1.34 7.83 6.36 0.84 0.31 18.63 16.85 7.81 13.63
M erger a rb 106 0.89 0.54 3.04 3.72 -0.17 1.14 6.70 5.20 0.82 0.15 20.67 15.82 11.63 15.57
Conv. arb 106 1.02 0.51 2.11 1.71 -0.14 1.38 7.18 5.33 0.73 0.14 30.93 17.31 12.81 16.87
Fixed incom e 36 0.58 0.35 2.37 1.97 -2.27 2.30 17.10 15.98 0.82 0.21 19.59 16.53 11.13 21.64
CO
o
*-h
to
00
Table 2
D escription of the liquidity factors
This table presents summary statistics (Panel A) and pair-wise correlations (Panel B) for six determinants of time- 
varying liquidity over the sample period, January 1993 to August 2004.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
Stock market return 0.76 4.28 -0.57 3.55
Stock market volatility 15.40 7.64 1.44 6.06
Stock market liquidity -2.72 7.20 -0.97 6.07
Bond market return 0.03 1.16 -0.53 3.78
Bond market volatility 3.93 1.18 0.85 4.47
Bond market liquidity 0.05 0.02 0.16 1.13
Panel B: Pair-wise correlation among liquidity factors
Stock m k t 
re tu rn
Stock m kt 
vo latility
Stock m kt 
liquidity
B ond m kt 
re tu rn
B ond m kt 
vo la tility
Stock m k t vo la tility -0.16
Stock m k t liqu id ity 0.19 -0.17
B ond m k t re tu rn 0.04 0.06 -0.07
B ond m k t vo latility 0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.30
B ond m k t liqu id ity -0.15 0.48 -0.22 -0.01 0.03
Table 3
D eterm inants of hedge fund liquidity - general specification
This table shows the results of estimating the relation between liquidity in hedge fund returns and the nine factors listed 
for the eight strategies during the sample period January 1993 to August 2004. A positive parameter estimates indicates a 
positive relationship between the factor and the degree of autocorrelation in the fund return, and thus a negative relation 
between the factor and fund liquidity. The t-statistics are reported parentheses below the parameter estimates; parameters 
that axe significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level axe in bold. All t-statistics and hypothesis tests axe 
based on Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors. In the third-last and second-last rows we present the x 2-statistics and 
p-values of joint tests that all time-varying liquidity factors have coefficients equal to zero, i.e. that the serial correlation 
(liquidity) of all hedge fund returns in a given style is constant. This statistic has the x 2 distribution with nine degrees of 
freedom under the null hypothesis, and the 95% critical value is 16.92. The final row of the table presents the value of the 
log-likelihood at the optimum for each style.
Table 3
D eterm inants of hedge fund liquidity - general specification
See the previous page for a description of this table.
E quity-based  strateg ies N o n  equ ity -b ased  stra teg ies
Factor
Market
neutral
Equity
hedge
Equity
non-hedge
Merger
arbitrage
Distressed
securities
Convertible
arbitrage
Fixed
income
Global
macro
Stock market return -0 .0 3 -0 .0 5 -0 .0 9 -0 .0 3 -0 .0 2 -0 .00 0.02 -0 .0 2
( - 2 .11) ( - 3 .16) ( - 1.37) (-1.22) ( - 0.70) (-0.11) (0.66) ( - 1.16)
Stock market volatility 0.00 -0 .00 -0 .01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 -0 .01
(0.38) ( - 0.18) ( - 0.28) (1.23) (1.94) (4 .30 ) (2 .21 ) ( - 0.47)
Stock market liquidity 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0 .01 -0 .01 0.00 -0 .0 0 0.01
(0.95) (1.46) (1.21) ( - 1.39) (-1.21) ( - 0.35) ( - 0.03) (0.88)
Bond market return 0.12 0.24 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.03 -0 .0 4 0.18
(2 .41 ) (2 .90) (0.71) (0.90) (0.98) (0.30) ( - 0.83) (2 .54)
Bond market volatility 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0 .0 4 0.06 0.05
(0.58) (1.05) (0.10) (0 .03) (0.03) ( - 0.50) (0.80) (1.20)
Bond market liquidity 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0 .03 - 7 .7 7 0.00 0.06
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (-0.01) ( - 1.72) (0.00) (0.01)
Winter dummy 0.02 -0 .0 8 0.16 0.14 0.18 -0 .0 6 0.01 -0 .0 2
(0 .19) ( - 0.53) (0.49) (0.88) (1.24) ( - 0.27) (0.06) ( - 0.18)
Net fund flow 0.01 0.01 -9 .5 9 -0 .1 0 5.28 -0 .0 9 0.06 0.01
(0.29) (0.27) ( - 0.77) ( - 3 .18) (0.80) ( - 1.85) (2 .16) (1 .9 8 )
Sign of "true return" 0.04 0.03 -0 .00 -0 .0 7 -0 .0 5 -0 .1 3 - 0 .3 3 0.06
(0 .60) (0.37) (-0.01) ( - 0.81) ( - 0.50) ( - 1.25) ( - 3 .0 5 ) (0.97)
X2-statistic
p-value
19.41
0.02
27.17
0.00
31.69
0.00
35.80
0.00
26.59
0.00
52.75
0.00
53.16
0.00
13.40
0.15
Log likelihood -176.00 -104.38 -42.23 -143.18 -114.14 -120.23 -36.82 -148.88
Tbble 4
D eterm inants of hedge fund liquidity - reduced specification
This table shows the results of estimating the relation between liquidity in hedge fund returns and the nine factors listed 
for the eight strategies during the sample period January 1993 to August 2004. A positive parameter estimates indicates a 
positive relationship between the factor and the degree of autocorrelation in the fund return, and thus a negative relation 
between the factor and fund liquidity. The models presented are obtained from general-to-simple specification searches, 
where we started with the most general models, presented in Table 3, and then sequentially eliminated factors until all 
the factors remaining in the models were significant at 10% level. See the text for a more detailed description of our 
model selection algorithm. The t-statistics are reported parentheses below the parameter estimates; parameters that are 
significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level are in bold. All t-statistics and hypothesis tests are based on 
Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors. In the third-last and second-last rows we present the x 2-statistics and p-values 
of joint tests that all time-varying liquidity factors have coefficients equal to zero, i.e. that the serial correlation (liquidity) 
of all hedge fund returns in a given style is constant. This statistic has the x 2 distribution with two or three degrees of 
freedom under the null hypothesis (depending on the number of factors remaining in the reduced model), and the 95% 
critical values are 5.99 and 7.81 respectively. The final row of the table presents the value of the log-likelihood at the 
optimum for each style.
Thble 4
D eterm inants of hedge fund liquidity - reduced specification
See the previous page for a description of this table.
Factors
Equity-based strategies N o n  equity-based strategies
Market
neutral
Equity
hedge
Equity
non-hedge
Merger
arbitrage
Distressed
securities
Convertible
arbitrage
Fixed
income
Global
macro
Stock market return -0 .0 2 -0 .0 3 -0 .1 0
( - 2 .00 ) ( - 2 .55) ( - 3 .17)
Stock market volatility — — — — 0.03 0.04 0.02 —
(2 .65 ) (4 .87) (3 .18)
Stock market liquidity — — 0.02 — — — — —
(2 .57)
Bond market return 0.11 0.21 — — 0.10 — — 0.15
(2 .49 ) (3 .36) (1.92) (2 .54)
Bond market volatility - - - - - - - -
Bond market liquidity — — — — — - 7 .9 0 — —
( - 1.82)
Winter dummy — — — 0.36 0.26 — — —
(2 .99 ) (2 .17)
Net fund flow — — — -0 .1 0 — -0 .0 9 0.05 0.01
( - 2 .59) ( - 2 .35) (2 .50 ) (1.83)
Sign of "true return" — — — — — -0 .3 5 —
( - 3 .54)
X2-statistic 
p-value
10.69
0.00
16.51
0.00
12.88
0.00
14.74
0.00
20.75
0.00
3 5 .77
0.00
25.19
0.00
10.15
0.01
Log likelihood -176 .05 -1 0 4 .4 7 -42 .27 -143.59 -114 .22 -120 .39 -3 6 .8 6 -148 .9 6
Table 5
Predictors of hedge fund liquidity
This table shows the results of estimating the relation between liquidity in hedge fund returns and the nine factors 
listed for the eight strategies during the sample period January 1993 to August 2004. All factors in this specification are 
lagged by one month, meaning that this model may be used for predicting future hedge fund liquidity. A positive parameter 
estimates indicates a positive relationship between the factor and the degree of autocorrelation in the fund return, and thus 
a negative relation between the factor and fund liquidity. The t-statistics are reported parentheses below the parameter 
estimates; parameters that are significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level are in bold. All t-statistics and 
hypothesis tests are based on Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors. In the third-last and second-last rows we present 
the x 2-statistics and p-values of joint tests that all time-varying liquidity factors have coefficients equal to zero, i.e. that 
the serial correlation (liquidity) of all hedge fund returns in a given style is constant. This statistic has the x 2 distribution 
with eight degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis, and the 95% critical value is 15.51. The final row of the table 
presents the value of the log-likelihood at the optimum for each style.
Thble 5
Predictors of hedge fund liquidity
See the previous page for a description of this table.
Lagged factors
E quity-based  strateg ies N o n  eq u ity-b ased  stra teg ies
Market
neutral
Equity
hedge
Equity
non-hedge
Merger
arbitrage
Distressed
securities
Convertible
arbitrage
Fixed
income
Global
macro
Stock market return -0 .0 3 -0 .0 5 -0 .0 4 -0 .0 3 -0 .0 3 - 0 .0 4 - 0 .0 3 - 0 .0 5
( - 2 .67 ) ( - 3 .84) ( - 1.28) ( - 2 .06 ) ( - 2 .46) ( - 2 .8 2 ) ( - 2 .43) ( - 3 .8 5 )
Stock market volatility 0.00 -0 .0 2 -0 .03 -0 .0 1 -0 .0 0 -0 .0 1 0.00 -0 .0 1
(0.46) ( - 1.88) ( - 1.53) (2 .4 2 ) ( - 0.08) ( - 0.67) (0.06) ( - 1.48)
Stock market liquidity 0.00 -0 .0 0 -0 .00 -0 .01 -0 .0 2 - 0 .0 3 - 0 .0 4 -0 .01
(0.07) ( - 0.13) ( - 0.26) ( - 1.30) ( - 2 .20) ( - 3 .65) ( - 3 .8 6 ) ( - 1.32)
Bond market return -0 .0 8 -0 .0 6 -0 .12 -0 .0 3 -0 .0 7 - 0 .1 8 0.11 -0 .1 2
( - 1.72) ( - 0.99) ( - 1.09) ( - 0.58) ( - 0.89) ( - 2 .93) (1.70) ( - 1.83)
Bond market volatility 0.03 -0 .0 9 -0 .0 4 -0 .03 -0 .04 - 0 .1 4 -0 .0 7 0.01
(0.62) ( - 1.23) ( - 0.31) ( - 0.56) ( - 0.44) ( - 2 .10) ( - 1.56) (0.05)
Bond market liquidity -0 .0 3 -0 .0 2 -0 .01 -9 .7 9 0.01 0.03 0.04 -2 .1 2
( - 0.01) ( - 0.00) ( - 0.00) ( - 1 .99) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) ( - 0.19)
Winter dummy 0.05 -0 .15 0.23 0.33 0.29 0.09 0.20 -0 .01
(0.49) ( - 1.05) (1.06) (3 .11) (1.70) (0.60) (1.90) ( - 0.02)
Net fund flow -0 .0 0 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 - 0 .0 0 0.08 0.00
( - 0.20) (4 .01) (0.71) (0.84) (0.02) ( - 3 .90) (1.57) (1 .9 6 )
X2-statistic 
p-value
19.47
0.01
59.99
0.00
12.88
0.12
38.76
0.00
25.71
0.00
51.60
0.00
57.09
0,00
38.23
0.00
Log likelihood -176.89 -103.78 -42.01 -142.67 -113.85 -119.21 -36.41 -149.45
4^4^
O
*-b
CO
00
Table 6
D eterm inants of hedge fund liquidity - robustness checks
This table shows the results of estimating the relation between liquidity in hedge fund returns and the nine factors listed 
for five categories of hedge funds, during the sample period January 1993 to August 2004. “Live” funds are those that were 
still reporting to the database as at the end of our sample, while “dead” funds are those that had ceased reporting. “Open” 
funds are those that were open to new money as at the end of our sample period, while “closed” funds were not accepting 
new money. “Non-audited” funds that had not yet been audited as at the end of our sample period. In all cases we only 
consider with at least 48 observations. A positive parameter estimates indicates a positive relationship between the factor 
and the degree of autocorrelation in the fund return, and thus a negative relation between the factor and fund liquidity. 
The t-statistics are reported parentheses below the parameter estimates; parameters that are significantly different from 
zero at the 95% confidence level are in bold. All t-statistics and hypothesis tests are based on Newey-West (1987) robust 
standard errors. In the second-last and last rows we present the x 2-statistics and p-values of joint tests that all time-varying 
liquidity factors have coefficients equal to zero, i.e. that the serial correlation (liquidity) of all hedge fund returns in a given 
style is constant. This statistic has the x 2 distribution with nine degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis, and the 
95% critical value is 16.92.
Table 6
D eterm inants of hedge fund liquidity - robustness checks
the previous page for a description of this table.
Live
funds
Dead
funds
Open
funds
Closed
funds
Non-audited
funds
Number of funds 361 248 308 48 2 0
Factors
Stock market return -0 .0 3 - 0 .0 1 - 0 .0 2 -0 .0 3 -0 .0 3
(-1 .65) (-0 .96) (-1 .55) (-1 .63) (-1 .63)
Stock market volatility 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0.03 0 .0 1
(1.37) (1.68) (1.18) (1.88) (0.42)
Stock market liquidity 0 .0 1 - 0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
(0.60) (-0 .70) (0.48) (1.87) (1.60)
Bond market return 0 . 1 0 0.15 0 . 1 0 0.14 0.06
(2 .04) (2 .25 ) (1.96) (2 .42 ) (0.60)
Bond market volatility 0 .0 2 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 - 0 .0 1 -0 .0 9
(0.31) (0.00) (0.28) (-0 .10) (-1 .20)
Bond market liquidity 0.32 0.09 0.03 0 .0 1 0 .0 2
(0.09) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Winter dummy 0.06 0 .0 0 0.07 0 .0 0 0 .1 2
(0.56) (0.02) (0.61) (0.02) (0.74)
Net fund flow 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
(0.08) (0.92) (0.63) (1.71) (1.36)
Sign of "true return" - 0 .0 2 -0 .05 -0 .03 0 .0 1 - 0 .0 1
(-0 .34) (-0.66) (-0 .42) (0.13) (-0 .10)
X2-statistic 18.21 25.99 18.71 31.99 16.34
p-value 0.03 0 .0 0 0.03 0 .0 0 0.06
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Tbble 7: Finite-sam ple size of t-tests on individual factor coefficients
This table presents the proportion of t-statistics on the coefficients on individual factors that were outside the 95% 
confidence interval (±1.96) across the simulation replications. As T  —* oo these proportions asymptote to 0.05, the nominal 
size of this test. The simulation design is described in the body of the text. These results are based on 300 replications.
No missing 
no ‘true return
obs,
’ factor
With missing obs 
and ‘true return’ factor
N u m b er o f funds: K  =  1 II M O II cn o K =  1
orHII* owII
■
Sample Number of
size factors
T  =  75 1 0.09 0.09 0.06 0 .1 0 0.07 0.03
T =  150 1 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04
II Cn
 
O
 
O 1 0 .0 2 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
T  =  75 4 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.05 0 .0 2
T =  150 4 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.03
II Cn O o 4 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.05
T  =  75 8 0.23 0.08 0.06 0 .1 1 0.06 0.04
T =  150 8 0.08 0.07 0.06 0 .1 0 0.05 0.04
T  — 500 8 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.05
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Table 8: Finite-sam ple size of x2 joint tests on factor coefficients
This table presents the proportion of x 2-statistics that were larger than the 95% critical value of the appropriate x 2 
distribution across the simulation replications. (The degrees of freedom is equal to the number of factors.) As T  —> oo 
these proportions asymptote to 0.05, the nominal size of this test. The simulation design is described in the body of the 
text. These results are based on 300 replications.
No missing obs, 
no ‘true return7 factor
With missing obs, 
and ‘true return’ factor
N u m b er o f  funds: K =  1 K =  10 K =  50 K =  1 K =  10
olOII
Sample Number
size of factors
T  =  75 1 • 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.03
T =  150 1 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0 .0 1
T  =  500 1 0 .0 2 0.09 0.04 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
T  =  75 4 0.33 0.16 0.08 0.73 0.17 0.08
■S II I—* Cn o 4 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.41 0 .1 0 0.03
T  =  500 4 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.04
T  =  75 8 0.78 0.33 0 .2 1 0.98 0.45 0.18
T =  150 8 0.45 0.19 0 .1 2 0.79 0.16 0.06
II cn o o 8 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.06
Smoothing profile for various values of delta
 delta =-0.25
 delta = 0
delta = 0.25 
-  -  delta = 0.5
jg 0.6
<D£
0.4
0.2
- 0.2
-0.4
0 1 2 3 4
lag ( j )
F igu re  1: This figure shows the relationship between the MA coefficients, 9 j ,  and the smoothing parameter, S, for various 
values of S.
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F igu re  2: This figure plots the estimated fraction of the true return at time t revealed in the observed return at time t , 
denoted 6q, based on the model for time-varying liquidity and from G LM ’s constant Qq model. The styles presented are 
Equity hedge, Equity non-hedge, Market neural, and Global macro.
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F igu re 3: This figure plots the estimated fraction of the true return at time t revealed in the observed return at time t , 
denoted 6q , based on the model for time-varying liquidity and from G LM ’s constant 6o model. The styles presented are 
Merger arbitrage, Distressed securities, Convertible arbitrage, and Fixed income arbitrage.
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A bstract
We examine the impact of market dispersion on the performance of hedge funds using 
hedge fund indices and a panel of monthly returns on over 600 individual hedge funds. Market 
dispersion is measured by cross-sectional volatility, that is, the standard deviation across all 
asset returns in one time period. We exploit the information held in the cross-sectional 
dispersion of equity returns and find that market dispersion and the performance of hedge 
funds are positively related across all equity-oriented hedge funds. Containing information 
very different from other factors, cross-sectional volatility is an important determinant of 
hedge fund returns. We also find the level of hedge fund return dispersion is positively 
related to the level of market dispersion.
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1 Introduction
Understanding risk exposure of hedge funds has become an increasingly important area of 
research since the hedge fund industry has grown to be one of the most important segments 
of the financial services industry. The assets under management by hedge funds is estimated 
to have surpassed $1.4 trillion at the end of 2006 and, when combined with leverage-intensive 
strategies, this is large enough to move markets around the world. Risk modeling is an es­
sential tool for hedge fund managers because they often take sizable active bets and use 
extensive leverage. These models can help them to understand the risks taken to achieve 
previous returns and to forecast future risk so that managers are able to accurately balance 
return against risk. Hedge fund investors need a better understanding of hedge funds’ risk 
exposure when they make investment management decisions involving hedge funds. Regu­
lators are also concerned about the potential damage hedge funds can cause to stability of 
financial markets.
A number of recent papers have studied the risk exposures and returns of hedge funds. 
Using a variety of hedge fund databases, Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), 
Agarwal and Naik (2000), Edwards and Caglayan (2001), Fung and Hsieh (1997, 2002) and 
Liang (1999, 2000, 2001) offer comprehensive studies of historical hedge fund performance. 
Another strand of literature focuses more on the characteristic of risk and return in specific 
hedge fund strategies. For example, Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) study the “risk-arbitrage” 
strategy; Fung and Hsieh (2001) focus on the “trend following” strategy and Agarwal and 
Naik (2004) study a number of equity-oriented strategies. However, none of these studies 
focuses on hedge funds’ exposure to market volatility risk.
Some related studies examine the issue whether hedge funds amplify market volatilities 
and impair stability of financial markets (see, Eichengreen et al., 1998, Fung and Hsieh, 
2 0 0 0 ), but they do not examine whether hedge funds benefit from volatile financial markets, 
i.e, whether hedge funds exhibit systematic exposure to volatility risk. Bondarenko (2004) 
estimates the value of the variance contract from prices of traded options and finds that 
the variance return is a key determinant in explaining performance of hedge funds. Most
2
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hedge funds exhibit negative exposure to the variance return, implying that they actually be 
short in volatility owing to the nature of their strategies. Hence, the performance of hedge 
funds tends to be worse when markets are volatile. This seems to contradict the conventional 
wisdom that hedge funds thrive in volatile financial markets. As alternative investment tools 
the primary benefit to hedge fund investing is the low correlation between returns of hedge 
funds and of traditional asset classes1.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive empirical investigation of the impact of market 
dispersion on the profitability of hedge funds. We use cross-sectional volatility to measure 
the magnitude of market dispersion. In contrast to time series market volatility, which is 
a measure of the variation of market returns over a period of time, cross-sectional market 
volatility is the standard deviation across all asset returns at one time period. Time series 
market volatility is the volatility experienced by holders of aggregate index funds and it 
is the measure for market risk which is nondiversifiable. There is an extensive literature 
on time series market volatility (please see Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992), Ghysels, 
Harvey and Renault (1996) for the summary of some literature). On the contrary, cross- 
sectional volatility captures the cross-sectional dispersion of asset returns within a market 
at one time period. For equity markets, the dynamics of cross-sectional volatility axe of 
economic importance to hedge funds for several reasons. First, it is a good measure of 
opportunities available to hedge funds for generating active returns because it helps describe 
how the environment for strategies driven by stock, or sector selection is changing: if stock 
returns were all the same, their cross-sectional volatility would be zero and there would be 
no opportunity to produce active returns. As the cross-sectional volatility increases, so does 
the opportunity to out-perform/under-perform a benchmark. Therefore, if cross-sectional 
volatility is interpreted as a means to measure the opportunities for fund managers to add 
value, high cross-sectional volatility in markets probably means more opportunities for active 
fund managers to outperform the market.
H a tto n  (2007) proposes generalizing the concept of “market neutrality” to consider the “completeness” of 
the fund’s neutrality to  market risks. “Complete neutrality” corresponds to independence of the fund and 
the market returns. He finds that about one-quarter of funds in the “market neutral” category are not in 
fact market neutral.
3
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Second, cross-sectional volatility can also be regarded as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk 
because it is a measure of heterogeneity across the securities in the market, and the hetero­
geneity of security returns is driven by idiosyncratic shocks to these securities. Campbell, 
Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) decompose the total volatility of a stock into three compo­
nents, market volatility, industry volatility, and firm specific (idiosyncratic) volatility. Cross- 
sectional volatility can be viewed as the weighted average of idiosyncratic stock volatility. 
If cross-sectional volatility is related to the performance of hedge funds, it means that idio­
syncratic risk matters for hedge funds. The possible rationale is that as highly sophisticated 
investors, hedge funds seek to exploit pricing inefficiencies between related individual secu­
rities, hence risks that they face are related to idiosyncratic stock volatility, not aggregate 
market volatility. When idiosyncratic volatility is high larger pricing errors become possible 
(Ingersoll 1987, Chapter 7, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Whether idiosyncratic risk is a deter­
minant of hedge fund performance is also directly related to the debate in empirical finance 
of whether idiosyncratic risk is priced in the equities market.
As a first step in our investigation, we estimate the cross-sectional volatility of equity 
returns across time using CRSP data from January of 1994 to December of 2004. Each 
month, we use all the stocks which have a valid return for that month. Consistent with 
previous studies, the cross-sectional volatility of equity returns varies significantly over the 
sample period and is serially correlated. We then test the hypothesis that cross-sectional 
volatility affects the profitability of hedge funds using hedge fund indices from Hedge Fund 
Research (HFR). HFR databases classifies hedge funds into several categories according to 
their investment strategies. To examine incremental explanatory value of cross-sectional 
volatility to hedge fund returns, we conduct a careful analysis on risk adjustments for hedge 
fund returns to obtain hedge fund abnormal performance. Many studies have shown that 
due to the dynamic trading strategies and derivatives used by hedge funds, traditional linear 
asset pricing models could give misleading results on hedge fund performance. We use 
the seven-factor model of Fung and Hsieh (2004). These factors have been shown to have 
considerable explanatory power for hedge fund returns, and are studied in the third chapter 
of this thesis.
4
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The results at the hedge fund index level strongly suggest that there is a genuine relation 
between cross-sectional volatility and the performance of hedge funds. To examine this issue 
in a more structured way, we provide parametric joint (cross-fund) tests using the individual 
hedge fund return data from the Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets 
(CISDM) hedge fund database. Since it is well documented that hedge fund returns exhibit 
significant serial correlation, we estimate a pooled regression model with panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE). Our PCSE specification allows errors to be contemporaneously 
correlated, heteroskedastic across funds and autocorrelated within each fund’s time series. 
We report the results of several such joint tests. We find a highly statistically significant 
positive relation between cross-sectional dispersion of equity returns and hedge fund returns.
We further investigate how the dispersion of hedge fund returns corresponds to the dis­
persion of market. Silva, Sapra and Thorley (2001) find that the wide dispersion in security 
returns has led to wide dispersion in mutual fund returns. Consistent with findings in mu­
tual funds, we find that the level of hedge fund return dispersion is also positively related to 
the level of market dispersion. This has important implications for hedge fund performance 
evaluation.
Overall, our results suggest that the cross-sectional volatility can explain part of hedge 
fund returns. Cross-sectional volatility contains information very different from other fac­
tors, and it is an important determinant of fund returns. We also extend the literature on 
idiosyncratic risk by studying the exposure of hedge funds to the average idiosyncratic risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2  discusses related literature. 
Section 3 presents the measures of cross-sectional volatility and links market dispersion to 
the performance of hedge funds. Section 4 discusses implications for portfolio management. 
Section 5 concludes.
2 R elated literature
While time series volatility has been extensively studied, little study has been done on 
cross-sectional volatility. Hwang (2001) compares the properties of cross-sectional volatility
5
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with those of time-series market volatility such as squared market returns in the UK and US 
markets. His empirical results show that cross-sectional market volatility is highly correlated 
with time-series market volatility and contains more information about the market evolution 
than squared market returns.
Since cross-sectional volatility can be regarded as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk, another 
closely related literature is the relation between idiosyncratic risk and stock returns. The 
asset pricing literature does not have consensus in the cross-sectional role of idiosyncratic 
risk in stocks. According to the traditional CAPM theory, only market risk should be priced 
in equilibrium and investors will not be rewarded for taking idiosyncratic risk because it can 
be diversified away. However, Levy (1978), Merton (1987), and Malkiel and Xu (2002) extend 
the CAPM. In their models, investors may hold undiversified portfolios for some exogenous 
reasons and idiosyncratic risk is priced in equilibrium. For example, in reality institutional 
investors may take certain idiosyncratic risk in order to obtain extraordinary returns. Hence, 
investors will care about total risk not just the market risk.
Empirical work provides mixed evidence for the role of idiosyncratic risk in asset pricing. 
On the one hand, Lintner (1965), Tinic and West (1986), Lehmann (1990) and Malkiel and 
Xu (2002) find there is a positive relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns. 
On the other hand, Longstaff (1989) finds that a cross-sectional regression coefficient on total 
variance for size-sorted portfolios has an insignificant negative sign. Ang, Hodrick, Xing and 
Zhang (2006) find stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have very low average returns. 
Hirt and Pandher (2005) find idiosyncratic volatility is negatively priced in risk-adjusted 
stock returns but its effect is not significant' in unadjusted returns.
At the aggregate level of idiosyncratic risk which can be measured by cross-sectional 
volatility, Goyal and Santa-clara (2003) show that the effects of idiosyncratic risk is diversified 
away in the equal-weighted portfolio variance measure, but it makes up almost 85% of the 
equal-weighted average stock variance. Their average stock variance can be interpreted 
as a measure of cross-sectional dispersion of stock returns. Goyal and Santa-clara find a 
significant positive relation between average stock variance (largely idiosyncratic) and the 
return on the market. However, Bali, Cakici,Yan and Zhang (2005) show that this result is
6
58 o f  128
driven by small stocks traded on the Nasdaq and it does not hold for the extended sample 
froml963:08 to 2001:12 and for the NYSE/AMEX and NYSE stocks.
Market dispersion captured by cross-sectional volatility is also linked to the dispersion of 
fund returns. Silva, Sapra and Thorley (2001) find that the wide dispersion in security re­
turns has led to wide dispersion in mutual fund returns. This wide dispersion in mutual fund 
returns has little to do with changes in the informational efficiency of the market or the range 
of managerial talent. Through correcting fund alphas with a period- and asset-class-specific 
measure of security return dispersion, they extend performance benchmarking to incorpo­
rate the information embedded in return dispersion. Ankrim and Ding (2002) demonstrate 
that changes in the level of cross-sectional volatility have a significant association with the 
distribution of active manager returns.
Cross-sectional volatility has also been studied under the different context. Christie 
and Huang (1995) use cross-sectional volatility to capture herd behavior in stock markets. 
Bessembinder, Chan, and Seguin (1996) use cross-sectional dispersion of stock returns as 
a proxy for company-specific information flows. Solnik and Roulet (2000) argue that dis­
persion is a better measure of the benefits of diversification than correlation. They show 
the relationship between correlation, dispersion and the standard deviation of the market 
portfolio.
The literature on hedge fund performances has increased rapidly. Fung and Hsieh (2001) 
study the "trend-following'’ strategy and find that equity-oriented hedge funds have non­
linear, option-like payoffs with respect to the market return. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) 
analyze the "risk-arbitrage" strategy. Agarwal and Naik (2004) study a number of equity- 
oriented strategies. In particular, they include call and put options on the S&P 500 composite 
index as risk factors.
3 Empirical analysis
In this section, we introduce our dispersion measures and investigate their relation to the 
performance of hedge funds. Fundamental to hedge fund investment process is a proper
7
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assessment of the risk and return potential of an investment strategy. The dynamics of cross- 
sectional return dispersion over time is an important factor in determining attractiveness of 
investment strategies.
3.1 D ata
Cross-sectional dispersion can be described by a number of different measures, such as range, 
inter-quartile range and mean absolute deviation. Cross-sectional volatility is an attractive 
proxy for dispersion, since- it takes into account the entire collection of securities returns 
within a market at one time period. We define equal-weighted cross-sectional volatility as:
CSVt = \
, N t
_ r«”)2 (!)
1 i=  1
where rn is the observed stock return on firm i at time t and rew is the cross-sectional 
average of the N returns in the aggregate market portfolio at time t. This dispersion measure 
quantifies the average proximity of individual returns to the realized market average.
We compute cross-sectional volatility measure using CRSP data from January of 1994 
to December of 2004. Each month, we use all the stocks which have a valid return for that 
month.
As in French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987), the estimate of the monthly stock market 
volatility is:
MVt = \
Nt N t- 1
Yji+2 Yjitrw
i=l i=1
where ra is the return to the S&;P portfolio on day i in month t and there are Nt trading 
days in month t.
Panel A of Table 1 gives descriptive statistics on the volatility measures. Both volatility 
measures are highly persistent and show a substantial time-variation.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the correlations among two volatility measures and other risk
8
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factors of hedge fund returns. As we can see from the table, cross-sectional volatility and 
time series market volatility is positively correlated. Small cap minus large cap return is also 
positively correlated with cross-sectional volatility.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of cross-sectional dispersion measure of US assets, together 
with time series market volatility. There is a steady increase in the cross-sectional volatility 
of monthly returns through the 1990s. During the Internet Bubble period 1999 to 2001, 
cross-sectional volatility increases sharply and reaches its peak. Since then, cross-sectional 
volatility has declined dramatically, falling below pre-bubble levels in 2004.
3.2 Performance of hedge funds
We analyse performance of hedge funds both at index level and individual fund level. We 
first focus on indices from HFR database. The appendix provides a brief description of 
the sector indices. We consider all main fund categories for which data are available from 
the database inception in 1990. Those include 7 equity categories: Convertible Arbitrage, 
Distressed Securities, Equity Hedge, Equity Market Neutral, Equity Non-Hedge, Event- 
Driven, Market Timing; 1 aggregate categories: Fund of Funds Composite. Table 2 reports 
summary statistics of monthly returns of HFR index.
For individual hedge fund returns, we use CISDM hedge fund database, maintained by 
the University of Massachusetts in cooperation with Managed Account Reports LLC, with 
data through August 2004. The CISDM database consists of two sets of files, one for live 
funds and one for dead funds. Each set consists of a performance file, containing monthly 
observations of returns, total net assets, and net asset values, and a fund information file, 
containing fund name, strategy type, management fees, and other supplementary details. 
We discard funds with less than 48 months of returns.
We single out Equity Hedge, Equity Nonhedge, Market Neutral, Merger Arbitrage, Dis­
tressed Securities2 and Convertible Arbitrage for further scrutiny. Equity hedge funds have 
grown considerably over time (now representing the single largest strategy according to
2In CISDM database, event driven style includes merger arbitrage and distressed securities.
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HFR) and have the highest alpha in Agarwal and Naik (2004). Another large sector of 
equity-oriented hedge funds is market neutral funds. Market Neutral strategies aim at zero 
exposure to specific equity market factors.
Table 3 presents summary statistics. For each strategy, the table lists the number of 
funds and means and standard deviations of basic summary statistics.
3.3 Cross-sectional market volatility and performance of hedge 
funds
We now explore the linkage between cross-sectional volatility and performance of hedge 
funds. To ensure robust findings, first we need to obtain risk-adjusted hedge fund returns. 
However, there is no well-established method for hedge fund risk adjustments in the existing 
literature due to their use of derivatives and dynamic trading strategies. Here we use as 
performance benchmarks the seven-factor model developed by Fung and Hsieh (2004). The 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&:P 500 return minus risk free rate, Wilshire small 
cap minus large cap return, change in the constant maturity yield of the 10-year Treasury, 
change in the spread of Moody’s Baa minus the 1 0 -year Treasury, bond PTFS, currency 
PTFS, and commodities PTFS, where PTFS denotes primitive trend following strategy. 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) show that their factor model strongly explains variation in individual 
hedge fund returns.
In order to obtain risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds, we regress the net-of-fee 
monthly excess return (in excess of the risk free rate) of a hedge fund on the seven-factor 
model.
Ri,t =  &i +  PiFt +  i^,ti (3)
where Ritt is the net-of-fee monthly excess return of fund i in month t, p i represents the 
risk exposure of fund i at month t to the various factors, and Ft is the value of the various 
factors at month t. The risk-adjusted return of fund i at month t is calculated as:
10
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A  n  1 ■ A  A /  A \
— Ri,t — Hi Ft =  +  U,ti (4)
A
where is the estimated risk exposure for fund i. We compute the risk-adjusted returns 
a^t as the sum of the intercept ai and the residual of Eq.(3).
To explore the relation between cross-sectional volatility and hedge fund performance, 
the empirical analysis is mainly based on the following regression:
at =  +  CSVt +  P2MVt +  c* (5)
where at is risk-adjusted hedge fund return index at month t, CSVt is cross-sectional 
volatility at month t, MVt is time series volatility at month t from equation 2 .
Table 4 reports the regression results. The exposure to cross-sectional volatility is positive 
and significant for convertible arbitrage, equity hedge and equity non-hedge funds. All three 
strategies involves long and short in equity markets. The sensitivity to time series volatility
is negative and insignificant for all' funds except equity hedge funds. It is probably not
surprising that event driven, market timing and fund of funds do not have significant exposure 
to cross-sectional volatility. Event driven funds involve investing in opportunities created 
by significant transactional events and the performance of market timing funds depends on 
fund managers’ ability to identify market uptrend and downtrend. Funds of funds invest in 
a group of other hedge funds, hence funds of funds actually diversify away idiosyncratic risks 
in individual hedge funds.
While the hedge fund index results reported above strongly suggest that hedge fund per­
formances are correlated with market dispersion, we can use the entire hedge fund database 
to make more definitive statements about the statistical significance of the market dispersion 
effect.
The joint tests can be considered simple generalizations of the regressions described 
above. Using all of the data from individual funds, we estimate a pooled regression model 
of the form:
11
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ai* =  Ci + b1CSVt +  b2MVt + ui, , (6)
with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). Where a t^ is the estimated risk-adjusted 
return of fund i at month t. The parameters b\ and 62 are constrained to be the same 
across funds. Our PCSE specification allows u^t to be contemporaneously correlated and 
heteroskedastic across funds, and autocorrelated within each fund’s time series.
We report the results of joint (across funds) tests of significance in Table 5. Consistent 
with previous results, equity hedge and convertible arbitrage exhibit significant positive 
exposure to cross-sectional volatility. The difference is that the performance of market 
neutral funds now is significantly positively correlated to cross-sectional volatility. This 
might be due to the use of different databases or the extra gain from cross-sectional data by 
pooling these funds within the same style.
In summary, consistent with the results of Bondarenko (2004), we find market volatility 
is negatively related to hedge fund performance across all strategies. For equity hedge and 
merger arbitrage, this negative relation is also significant. These results suggest that higher 
volatility was associated with lower hedge fund returns and many hedge funds could be short 
in volatility due to the nature of their strategies. Hedge funds may have a negative exposure 
to the market volatility risk in several ways. First, many equity-oriented hedge funds take 
short position on volatility through variance swaps, a forward contract on future realized 
price variance, or through dispersion trades whose payoff is equal to the difference between 
the variance of an index and its component stocks. The dispersion strategy typically consists 
of short selling options on a stock market index while simultaneously buying options on the 
component stocks, i.e. short market volatility and long dispersion. Second, equity-oriented 
hedge funds usually take bets on events such as mergers, spin-offs, takeovers, corporate 
restructuring, and reorganization. These strategies involve the risk of deal failure and are 
short the volatility risk because deals are more likely to fail in volatile markets than in normal 
markets.
The regression results also strongly suggest that the performance of equity style hedge
12
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funds is positively correlated with market dispersion. Cross-sectional volatility contains 
information very different from other factors which determine hedge fund returns. It is 
quite important for fund managers to take into account cross-sectional volatility. Suppose 
a talented fund manager has the real ability for picking up stocks and take long position 
on stock A and short position on stock B. When cross-sectional volatility increases, the 
difference between the movements of prices of A and B increases as A goes up and B goes 
down, so does the profit of the manager’s trading position. Another example is dispersion 
trading. Typically long dispersion means short selling options on a stock market index 
and buying options on the component stocks. When dispersion increases, individual stock 
volatility increases, and dispersion trading makes a profit.
3.4 Market dispersion and dispersion o f hedge fund returns
Dierick and Garbaravicius (2005) argue that the decreasing dispersion of hedge fund returns 
could be a broad indication that hedge fund positioning is becoming increasingly similar. Pat­
terns in pairwise correlation coefficients of individual hedge fund return performance within 
strategies also indicate that hedge fund positioning has resulted in a crowding of trades in 
some markets, possibly leaving them vulnerable to adverse market dynamics. These concerns 
are the greatest for convertible arbitrage and credit strategies, as these strategies generally 
have the highest leverage and therefore significant gross positions. This sub-section examines 
these issues by analysing the relationship between market dispersion and the dispersion of 
hedge fund returns.
To investigate the impact of market dispersion on the dispersion in hedge fund returns, 
we regress cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund returns on cross-sectional volatility of 
stock returns.
C S V R t =  7o +  7 i CSVt +  7  2S T R t +  j 3S M B t +  7 , C S V R t_i +  rjt (7)
where C S V R t is cross-sectional dispersion of hedge fund returns at month t, CSVt is 
cross-sectional volatility of stock returns at month t, S T R t is stock market return at month
13
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t, S M B t is small minus big portfolio return at month t. To control for serial correlation of 
C SV R t, we also include one lag of the dependent variable in the regression. Table 6  reports 
the regression results.
The results indicate that the dispersion in hedge fund returns is positively related to 
market dispersion. Therefore, the decreasing dispersion of hedge fund returns does not 
necessarily mean that hedge fund positioning is becoming increasingly similar. An increase 
in dispersion of hedge fund returns does not necessarily result from managers’s more diverse 
skill levels, but possibly from the magnified riskiness of bets taken by fund managers. Hedge 
fund managers construct portfolios to beat a particular benchmark by holding securities 
in proportions that are different from those in the benchmark. The larger the differences 
between the portfolio weights and the benchmark weights, the greater the active risks the 
manager is taking. The level of the active risk is influenced by variability of securities returns 
captured by cross-sectional volatility.
4 Im plication for portfolio management
The dynamics of cross-sectional volatility have important implications for portfolio manage­
ment. The decrease in cross-sectional volatility will makes it more difficult for hedge fund 
managers to generate a spread between their short and long positions, which means fewer 
opportunities to outperform benchmarks. During periods of low cross-sectional volatility, it 
is important for hedge fund managers to understand how and to what extent opportunities 
can be preserved. In order to maintain a constant level of active risk -  and therefore preserve 
the potential for active return -  a hedge fund manager must increase active exposures as 
cross-sectional volatility declines.
The cross-sectional dispersion of asset returns also has important implications for funds’ 
performance evaluation. A realized alpha of 10% generated during low cross-sectional volatil­
ity period probably means more to the investors than it does during the Internet Bubble 
period. Silva, Sapra and Thorley (2001) argue that an assessment of the performance of 
money managers should take into account the dispersion of stock returns during the period.
14
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They find that the increase in the dispersion of portfolios of money managers in 1999 is the 
result of an increase in the dispersion of the underlying stocks rather than an increase in the 
diversity of manager talents or a decrease in market efficiency
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study the impact of market dispersion on the performance of hedge funds. 
First, we estimate the cross-sectional dispersions of equity returns. Using U.S. stock mar­
ket data over the 1994-2004 period, we analyze the time-series properties of the market 
dispersions. We find that cross-sectional volatilities are time-varying and persistent. The 
fluctuations in the cross-sectional dispersion are positively related to the performance of 
equity-based hedge funds. We show that market dispersion, proxied by cross-sectional volatil­
ity, may explain part of the hedge fund returns not accounted for by the standard factors. 
Cross-sectional volatility should be considered as a new risk factor for equity-based hedge 
funds.
Our findings have important implications for hedge fund portfolio management and per­
formance evaluation. During periods of high cross-sectional volatility, many hedge funds 
may deliver statistically positive risk-adjusted returns (alpha) if the cross-sectional volatility 
exposure is not taken into account. However, after correcting for cross-sectional volatility 
exposure, the performance of some hedge funds may become less impressive, with positive 
alphas becoming negative or statistically insignificant.
Our paper raises some interesting issues. Cross-sectional volatility can be regarded as 
a proxy of aggregate idiosyncratic risk. An interesting direction for future research would 
be to examine the determinants of idiosyncratic risk and how it changes over time. If we 
could understand the changes in cross-sectional volatility, we will probably have a betterI
understanding of hedge funds’ risk exposure.
15
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6 Appendix:
H F R  M on th ly  P erform ance indices
Hedge Fund Research (HFR) Monthly indices are equally weighted performance indices. 
The indices axe broken down into several categories by strategy, including the HFR Com­
posite Index, which accounts for over 1,400 funds listed on the internal HFR Database.
The following classification of hedge fund categories is reproduced from the HFR website.
E q u ity  H ed ge funds invest in a core holding of long equities hedged at all times with 
short sales of stocks and/or stock index options. Some managers maintain a substantial 
portion of assets within a hedged structure and commonly employ leverage. Where short 
sales are used, hedged assets may be comprised of an equal dollar value of long and short 
stock positions. Other variations use short sales unrelated to long holdings and/or puts on 
the S&P 500 index and put spreads. Conservative funds mitigate market risk by maintaining 
market exposure from zero to 100 percent. Aggressive funds may magnify market risk by 
exceeding 100 percent exposure and, in some instances, maintain a short exposure. In 
addition to equities, some funds may have limited assets invested in other types of securities.
E q u ity  M arket N eu tra l funds seek to profit by exploiting pricing inefficiencies between 
related equity securities, neutralizing exposure to market risk by combining long and short 
positions. One example of this strategy is to build portfolios made up of long positions in 
the strongest companies in several industries and taking corresponding short positions in 
those showing signs of weakness.
E q u ity  N on -H ed ge  funds are predominately long equities although they have the ability 
to hedge with short sales of stocks and/or stock index options. These funds are commonly 
known as “stock-pickers.” Some funds employ leverage to enhance returns. When market 
conditions warrant, managers may implement a hedge in the portfolio. Funds may also 
opportunistically short individual stocks. The important distinction between equity non­
hedge funds and equity hedge funds is equity non-hedge funds do not always have a hedge 
in place. In addition to equities, some funds may have limited assets invested in other types 
of securities.
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E ven t-D riven  is also known as “corporate life cycle” investing. This involves investing 
in opportunities created by significant transactional events, such as spin-offs, mergers and 
acquisitions, bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations and share buybacks. The portfo­
lio of some Event-Driven managers may shift in majority weighting between Risk Arbitrage 
and Distressed Securities, while others may take a broader scope. Instruments include long 
and short common and preferred stocks, as well as debt securities and options. Leverage may 
be used by some managers. Fund managers may hedge against market risk by purchasing 
S&P put options or put option spreads.
M arket T im in g  funds allocate assets among investments by switching into investments 
that appear to be beginning an uptrend, and switching out of investments that appear to be 
starting a downtrend. This primarily consists of switching between mutual funds and money 
markets. Typically, technical trend-following indicators are used to determine the direction 
of a fund and identify buy and sell signals. In an up move “buy signal,” money is transferred 
from a money market fund into a mutual fund in an attempt to capture a capital gain. In 
a down move “sell signal,” the assets in the mutual fund are sold and moved back into the 
money market for safe keeping until the next up move. The goal is to avoid being invested 
in mutual funds during a market decline.
Fund o f  Funds Composite Index. Fund of Funds invest with multiple managers through 
funds or managed accounts. The strategy designs a diversified portfolio of managers with 
the objective of significantly lowering the risk (volatility) of investing with an individual 
manager. The Fund of Funds manager has discretion in choosing which strategies to invest 
in for the portfolio. A manager may allocate funds to numerous managers within a single 
strategy, or with numerous managers in multiple strategies. The minimum investment in a 
Fund of Funds may be lower than an investment in an individual hedge fund or managed 
account. The investor has the advantage of diversification among managers and styles with 
significantly less capital than investing with separate managers.
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Table 1
Panel A  D escriptive Statistics o f V olatility M easures
This table presents descriptive statistics on returns and measures of volatility. The sample 
period is January 1994 to December 2004. The variable CSV is the cross-sectional volatility 
of stock returns, MV is the time series market volatility. SD is the standard deviation, px and 
p2 are the first-order and second-order autocorrelation respectively.
Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Pi P2
CSV 0.19 0.05 2.31 9.85 0.29 0.26
MV 0.05 0 .0 2 1 .2 1 3.95 0.67 0.57
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Panel B  Pair-wise Correlation
This table reports pair-wise correlation among the determinants. CSV denotes cross- 
sectional volatility and MV denotes time-series market volatility. The Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) factors axe S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus 
large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant maturity yield of the 10-year Treasury 
(BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody’s Baa minus the 10-year Treasury (BAAMTSY), 
bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), 
where PTFS denotes primitive trend following strategy.
CSV MV SNPMRF SCMLC BD10RET BAAMTSY PTFSBD PTFSFX
CSV 1
MV 0.30 1
SNPMRF 0.19 -0.23 1
SCMLC 0.35 -0.16 -0.09 1
BD10RET -0.05 -0.18 0.02 0.07 1
BAAMTSY -0.02 0.40 -0.10 -0.27 -0.64 1
PTFSBD -0.04 0.27 -0.15 -0.05 -0.10 0.07 1
PTFSFX -0.07 0.01 -0.16 0.00 -0.19 0.14 0.15 1
PTFSCOM -0.14 -0.04 -0.11 -0.01 -0.06 0.06 0.15 0.31
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Table 2 Summary statistics of H FR  hedge fund indices
This table reports the means, standard deviations, skewness, kurtosis, first order autocorrelation(px) and minimum and 
maximum of returns for HFR hedge fund indices
Hedge fund strategy Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum Pi%
Convertible Arbitrage 0.93 0.93 -0.91 5.59 -3.19 3.33 22.3
Distressed Securities 1.07 1.62 -1.81 12.18 -8.50 5.06 23.8
Equity Hedge 1.52 2.69 0.14 4.14 -7.65 10.88 12.7
Equity Market Neutral 0.86 0.94 -0.02 3.25 -1.67 3.59 -0.3
Equity Non-Hedge 1.36 4.27 -0.51 3.49 -13.34 10.74 16.3
Event Driven 1.17 1.93 -1.40 8.44 -8.90 5.13 27.7
Market Timing 0.98 2.05 0.13 2.48 -3.28 5.96 15.8
Fund of Funds Composite 0.71 1.74 -0.29 7,43 -7.47 6.85 12.9
Thble 3 Summary statistics of CISDM  hedge funds
This table presents cross-sectional means and standard deviations of basic summary statistics for funds in the CISDM 
database over the sample period January 1993 to August 2004. K  is the number of funds. SD denotes standard deviations. 
p x%  and p 2%  denote first order and second order autocorrelation respectively.
C ategory K M ean SD Skewness K urtosis p i% p 2%
M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD
M kt neutral 121 0.96 0.57 3.88 2.98 0.44 1.19 6.57 5.70 13.85 17.72 7.54 15.27
E q hedge 58 0.99 0.84 5.18 2.74 0.01 1.10 6.40 4.85 13.99 16.23 6.88 14.16
Eq nonhedge 20 1.24 0.82 8.25 4.69 0.17 0.69 4.86 1.88 6.97 13.16 -0.01 11.30
G lobal m acro 90 0.96 0.81 5.30 3.54 0.28 0.97 5.60 4.40 9.51 16.81 1.98 15.14
D istressed 72 1.08 0.59 3.82 3.01 -0 .14 1.34 7.83 6.36 18.63 16.85 7.81 13.63
M erger arb 106 0.89 0.54 3.04 3.72 -0 .17 1.14 6.70 5.20 20.67 15.82 11.63 15.57
C onv. arb 106 1.02 0.51 2.11 1.71 -0 .14 1.38 7.18 5.33 30.93 17.31 12.81 16.87
F ixed  incom e 36 0.58 0.35 2.37 1.97 -2 .27 2.30 17.10 15.98 19.59 16.53 11.13 21.64
Table 4 R esults w ith  hedge fund index
This table reports the results of the regression at =  C  +  P1CSVt +  /?2MVt +  et for the 
HFR hedge fund indices during the full sample period from January 1994 to December 
2004. Where at is risk-adjusted hedge fund return index at month t, CSVt is cross-sectional 
volatility at month t, MVt is time series volatility at month t. The t-statistics in parentheses 
use Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Category C CSV MV R2
Convertible arbitrage 0.37 8.48 1.00 0.08
(1.37) ( 3.01) (0.14)
Distressed securities 1.18 -0 .4 2 -4 .9 0 0.01
(3.23) (-0 .23) (-0 .62)
Equity hedge -0 .0 5 8.46 -1 3 .6 1 0.12
(-0 .07) (1.96) ( -1 .8 6 )
Equity market neutral 1.01 -2 .9 4 -7 .1 9 0.04
(4.77) (-0 .74) (-1 .55 )
Equity non-hedge 0.32 16.23 -9 .1 8 0.12
(1.04) (4.03) (-1 .01)
Event driven 1.13 3.99 -10 .53 0.04
(4.54) (1.14) (-1 .78)
Market timing -0 .3 5 5.64 -0 .8 7 0.05
(-0 .57) (1.48) (-0 .16)
Fund of funds composite -0 .1 3 5.14 -7 .5 7 0.05
(-0 .23) (1.44) (-0 .82)
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Table 5 R esults w ith pooled regression
This table reports the results of the pooled regression aitt =  bi+b\C  SVt+b2 MVt +Ui,t with 
panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). Where a^t is the estimated risk-adjusted return of 
fund i at month t. The parameters b\ and 62 are constrained to be the same across funds. 
Our PCSE specification allows uift to be contemporaneously correlated and heteroskedastic 
across funds, and autocorrelated within each fund’s time series. Sample period: January 
1994 to August 2004.
CV MV
Equity hedge 12.50 -1 1 .3 3
(4.63) ( -2 .5 2 )
Equity non-hedge 13.48 -1 .5 8
(3.02) (-1 .19)
Market neutral 1 0 . 1 2 -1 .0 7
(4.79) (-0 .33 )
Merger arbitrage 3.84 - 9 .2 0
(1.80) (-2 .4 6 )
Convertible arbitrage 10.45 -0 .9 4
(4.87) (-0 .26)
Distressed securities 1.59 - 1 . 0 2
(0.98) (-0 .87 )
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Table 6 M arket dispersion and th e dispersion in hedge fund returns
This table reports the results of the regression C S V R t =  7 0 +  7 i CSVt +  7 2S T R t +  
7 3SMiJ* +  'y4C S V R t- i  +rit for three categories of hedge funds during the full sample period 
from January 1994 to December 2004. Where C S V R t is cross-sectional dispersion of hedge 
fund returns at month t, CSVt is cross-sectional volatility of stock returns at month t, S T R t 
is stock market return at month t, S M B t is small minus big portfolio return at month t. The 
t-statistics in parentheses use Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors.
Category CSV STR SMB CSVR*_i R2
Equity hedge 0.09 0.03 - 0 . 0 1 0.34 0 . 2 1
(2.21) (0.66) (-0 .18) (3.76)
Equity nonhedge 0.27 0 . 0 0 - 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.09
(2.25) (0.74) (-0 .06) (1.57)
Market neutral 0.08 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 0.28 0 . 1 2
(1.97) (0.56) (-0 .11) (1.98)
Merger arbitrage 0.12 -0 .0 4 0 . 0 2 0.21 0.13
(2.74) (-0 .80) (0.50) (2.32)
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Figure 1 P lo t of cross-sectional volatility  and tim e series m arket vo latility ( 1994-01: 2004-08)
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We assess the empirical success of Fung and Hsieh (2004) asset based style factors, a 
five-factor extension of Fama-French factors and statistical factors for explaining the hedge 
fund returns. We document that the first two sets of factor models explain a significant 
part of the systematic exposure of hedge funds and that the explanatory power of the five- 
factor extension of Fama and French is larger than those of the Fung and Hsieh seven-factor 
for all categories except for Distressed Securities and Fixed Income Arbitrage. Asymptotic 
principal component analysis of the individual fund regression residuals reveals that there 
are latent factors which are not captured by Fung-Hsieh and Fama-French models.
Keyw ords: F ac to r m odels; Hedge fund re tu rn s
*Contact address: London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. 
Email: s.li4@lse.ac.uk. My special thanks to Professor Gregory Connor and Dr Andrew Patton for their 
constructive comments and suggestions.
1
82 o f  128
1 Introduction
Understanding risk exposure of hedge fund returns is a fundamental issue for hedge fund 
managers, investors and regulators. A number of factor models have been put forward to 
explain hedge fund returns. Most evaluations of hedge fund risk depend crucially on these 
factor models. While some models of hedge fund returns use factors that have been used to 
explain securities returns, the others develop new factors that are linked to different asset 
types.
Despite the wide range of models developed, relatively little is known about how these 
models compare in terms of their ability to capture the actual source of hedge fund returns. 
There is no well-established method for explaining the dynamic behavior of hedge fund 
returns in the existing literature. The reason for this is partly due to the large diversity 
of the strategies employed by hedge funds and their dynamic nature. Previous studies are 
also based on different data sets, making it more difficult to compare their performance 
directly. The issue of how these models compare with each other is important since each 
model differs in its implications for understanding the risk of hedge funds and valuing hedge 
fund performance.
In this paper, we assess the empirical success of different factor models and compare their 
explanatory power for the cross section of hedge fund returns. We consider three types of 
factor models. The first set of models is asset-type based models. We use Fung and Hsieh 
(2004) seven-factor model (FH hereafter). The seven factors are two equity risk factors (S&;P 
500, SC-LC), two interest rate risk factors (the change in the yield of the 10 year treasury, 
and the change in the credit spread), and three trend-following factors (the portfolio returns 
of options on currencies, commodities, and long term bonds). The second set of models we 
consider is a five-factor extension of Fama and Freeh factors (FF hereafter). The five factors 
include equity market return, size, value, momentum and cross-sectional volatility factors .
Studying a large cross-section of 609 hedge fund return data over the 1994-2004 period, 
we document that both FH seven-factor and a five-factor extension of FF explain a significant 
part of the systematic exposure of hedge funds. The explanatory power of aggregate FH and
2
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FF factors varies across categories, ranging from 17.73% to 54.79% of the total variation 
in hedge fund returns. We also demonstrate that the explanatory power of FF factors is 
larger than those of FH seven-factor for all categories except Distressed Securities and Fixed 
Income Arbitrage, indicating FF factors better capture some of the systematic risk of hedge 
funds than FH seven factors. This may be partly due to the fact that a large portion of 
the hedge funds is equity-oriented and FF factors are all equity risk factors. Asymptotic 
principal component analysis of the individual fund regression residuals reveals that for 
all categories, FH and FF models successfully capture systematic variation in hedge fund 
returns. However, the overall explanatory power of the first five factors ranges from 13.89% 
to 36.34%, indicating there may be some latent factors which have not been captured by 
previous models.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the set of factor 
models considered here. Section 3 explains the data used in the empirical analysis and 
discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Types of factor models
We evaluate three types of factor models in this paper. The first set of models attempt 
to explain hedge fund returns based on the type of assets traded and the trading style 
of the hedge fund managers. This approach is adopted from Sharpe’s (1992) asset-class 
factor models. Sharpe decomposes a mutual fund’s return into two distinct components: 
asset-class factors such as large-cap stocks, growth stocks, and intermediate government 
bonds, which he interprets as "style”, and an uncorrelated residual that he interprets as 
"selection". Following this approach, a number of papers estimate factor models using a 
broad set of financial and economic factors, including equity index returns, interest rates, 
exchange rates and commodity prices (Schneeweis and Spurgin, 1998; Liang, 1999; Edwards 
and Caglayan, 2001; Ennis and Sebastian 2003; Capocci and Hubner, 2004; Hill, Mueller, 
and Balasubramanian, 2004). To capture the nonlinearities in hedge fund returns due to 
dynamic trading strategies and derivatives, some also include the returns to certain options-
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based strategies and other basic portfolios (Fung and Hsieh, 2001, 2004; Agarwal and Naik 
2000a,b, 2004). More recently, several papers focus on replicating hedge fund returns. Kat 
and Palaro (2005, 2006a,b) use sophisticated dynamic trading strategies involving liquid 
futures contracts to replicate the statistical properties of hedge-fund returns. However, 
Hasanhodzicy and Lo (2006) argue that some replicating strategies used by Kat and Palaro 
are too involved, even more complex than the hedge fund strategies they intend to replicate. 
They estimate linear factor models for individual hedge funds using six common factors, 
and find that for certain hedge-fund style categories, a significant fraction of funds’ expected 
return can be captured by common factors.
Among these factor models, the risk factors are not necessarily unique. A set of variables 
may be highly correlated with other variables. Linear combinations of different risk factors 
can produce substantially similar results. In this paper, we use Fung and Hsieh (2004) 
seven-factor model because from the practical perspective, their factors are mostly directly 
linked to conventional asset-class indices given the same level of explanatory power. The 
seven factors Eire two equity risk factors (S&P 500, SC-LC), two interest rate risk factors 
(the change in the yield of the 10 year treasury, and the change in the credit spread), and 
three trend-following factors (the portfolio returns of options on currencies, commodities, 
and long term bonds). Fung and Hsieh (2004) show that a large proportion of hedge fund 
returns can be explained by their factor model.
The second class of models we consider is a five-factor extension of Fama-French three- 
factor model. The FF model is well-established in the asset pricing literature. We choose 
this model because it has been successfully applied to returns of stocks, stock portfolios, and 
mutual funds. The FF model has three factors:. a market factor which is the excess return 
of the market portfolio (MKT hereafter), a size factor which captures return difference 
between a portfolio of low-capitalization stocks and a portfolio of high-capitalization stocks 
(SMB hereafter), and a value factor which is the return difference between a portfolio of 
high book-to-price stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-price stocks (HML hereafter). The 
fourth factor is the momentum factor as suggested by Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) and 
Carhart (1997). This captures the difference between the return to a portfolio with high
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cumulative returns over the past twelve months and the return to a portfolio with low 
cumulative returns over the past twelve months. The fifth factor is a cross-sectional volatility 
factor (CSV hereafter). In the second chapter of this thesis, we exploit the information held 
in the cross-sectional dispersion of equity returns. and find that cross-sectional volatility 
and the performance of hedge funds are positively related across all equity-oriented hedge 
funds. Containing information very different from other factors, cross-sectional volatility is 
an important determinant of hedge fund returns. See also Goyal and Santa Clara (2003), 
Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006a, 2006b), Connor, Hagmann and Linton (2007).
The third class of models is statistical factor models. These models perform maximum 
likelihood and principal-components-based factor analysis on panel data samples of stock 
returns to identify the pervasive factors in returns. This approach was applied by Fung and 
Hsieh (1997a) to hedge funds. They extract five mutually orthogonal principal components 
of the covariance matrix of their sample of 409 hedge funds and CTAs. Using the hedge funds 
most highly correlated with these principal components, they construct five “style factors” 
whose returns are highly correlated to the principal components. Brown and Goetzman 
(2001) perform cluster analysis to identify hedge fund strategy groups by minimizing the 
sum of squares within each group. See also Martin (2000), Bares, Gibson and Gyger (2001).
The three types of models are related but have different focuses. There are two factors 
overlapped between the FH and FF models: equity market return and size factors. While 
FH covers a broad range of asset types, FF focuses on equity markets. In a statistical factor 
model, the factors are estimated from the sample returns data by maximizing the fit of the 
model. Therefore, while statistical factors may yield high in-sample R 2s, they suffer from 
significant over-fitting bias and also lack economic interpretation. Theoretically, it is possible 
that a linear combination of the statistical factors is identical to FH and FF factors.
In this paper, we use a linear time-series regression approach to assess how well risk factors 
identified in previous study explain the variation in hedge fund returns. We first show the 
explanatory power of each factor model considered separately. Then we test whether the FH 
and FF models explain all of the pervasive comovements in returns against the alternative 
that statistical models have pervasive explanatory power not captured by the FH and FF
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models.
3 Empirical Analysis 
3.1 D ata
We use monthly returns and accompanying information on both live and “dead” individual 
hedge funds from January 1994 to August 2004 from the CISDM database. This data­
base provides monthly observations of returns, total net assets, and net asset values, and 
a fund information file, containing fund name, strategy type, management fees, and other 
supplementary details. We analyze 8 fund strategies, namely Merger Arbitrage, Distressed 
Securities, Equity Hedge, Equity NonHedge, Market Neutral, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Con­
vertible Arbitrage, Global Macro. We study funds with at least 48 months of observations, 
which leaves us with a total of 609 individual hedge funds.
Fung and Hsieh seven factors are from Hsieh’s website. S&;P 500 return minus risk 
free rate(S&;P), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SC-LC), change in the constant 
maturity yield of the 10-year Treasury (10Y), change in the spread of Moody’s Baa minus 
the 10-year Treasury (Cred Spr), bond PTFS (Bd Opt), currency PTFS (FX Opt), and 
commodities PTFS (Com Opt), where PTFS denotes primitive trend following strategy.
We obtain the data on MKT, SMB, HML, MOM from Ken French’s website. Cross- 
sectional volatility is constructed using CRSP data from January of 1994 to August of 2004. 
Each month, we use all the stocks which have a valid return for that month.
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the hedge fund returns over our sample period. 
For each strategy, the table lists the number of funds and means and standard deviations of 
basic summary statistics. Panel A in Table 2 contains summary statistics of our risk factors 
over the sample period. Panel B in Table 2 reports pair-wise correlation among the various 
factors, and shows that none have excessively high correlation.
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3.2 Explanatory power of risk factors
To measure the explanatory power of common risk factors for hedge funds, we first perform 
a univariate regression for each of the 609 hedge funds in our sample, regressing the hedge 
fund’s monthly returns on individual risk factors. Then we average the estimated coefficients 
across all funds and report the average values. We repeat the same analysis for each style 
of funds.
To assess the relative importance of each variable, we present in Table 3 results from 
univariate regressions of hedge fund returns on individual risk factors. Table 3 shows that 
hedge fund returns are significantly affected by all risk factors and factor sensitivities vary 
considerably across categories. Specifically, equity market returns have the strongest positive 
impact on hedge fund returns both in terms of significance and explanatory power. It is a 
significant factor across all categories except Fixed Income Funds. Not surprisingly, Equity 
NonHedge funds has the highest mean beta of 1.01 for equity market return, which explains 
40.65% of the variation in hedge fund returns. SMB is the second strongest determinant of 
hedge fund returns. Similar to equity market return, it is significantly positively related to 
hedge fund returns in all categories except Fixed Income Funds. It explains 10.53% of the 
variation in Equity NonHedge funds. In line with the findings of the second chapter, changes 
in aggregate idiosyncratic volatility have a strong positive impact on returns of Equity Hedge, 
Equity NonHedge, Equity Neutral, Distressed Securities and Convertible Arbitrage funds. 
It explains on average 10.39% of the time-series variation in Equity NonHedge fund returns. 
Next, HML and MOM are significant factors for equity-style funds including Equity Hedge, 
Equity NonHedge and Equity Neutral. Two interest rate risk, the change in 10-year treasury 
yields and the change in the yield spread between 10-year treasury and Moody’s Baa bonds 
are significant return drivers in Fixed Income Arbitrage funds. They explain on average 
5.84% and 7.00% of the variation respectively. Two interest risk and three trend-following 
factors are the major risk factors for a small portion of hedge funds.
Next, we analyze the joint explanatory power of all suggested factors in a series of re­
gressions of the type:
7
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Tit ~  OLi +  PuSt +  @2i^t +  eit (1)
where St is the vector of FH seven factors realized at time t, Ft is the vector of five-factor 
extension of FF model at time t, and and ft2i are the vectors of sensitivities. Table 4 
summarizes the results from three different specifications of regression (1), providing a clear 
picture of the relative power of risk factors in explaining hedge fund returns. We test for the 
statistical significance of each factor by calculating, for each individual fund regression, the 
t-statistic for each estimated coefficient, based on Newey-West heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. Then for each factor we calculate the percentage of t-statistics that are 
significant at a 95% confidence level across all funds within the same category. The resulting 
statistic has an exact binomial distribution under the null hypothesis that the factor sensi­
tivity is zero each period. Table 4 shows the means of the factor sensitivities, the percentage 
of significant t-statistics for each factor.
Column M l presents the combined explanatory power of FH seven factors. The explained 
variation of hedge fund returns range from 9.23% for Fixed Income Arbitrage funds to 44.72% 
for Equity NonHedge funds. Consistent with the results from univariate regressions, Equity 
Hedge, Equity NonHedge, Equity Neutral, Merger arbitrage, Distressed Securities and Global 
Macro funds have strong exposure to the two equity factors: S&;P and SC-LC. Distressed 
Securities also has strong negative exposure to credit spread risk factor and trend-following 
bond factor. Three trend-following factors, the portfolios of lookback options on bonds, 
currencies, and commodities are significant return drivers in trend-following funds. They are 
the major risk factors for 5-10% of hedge funds.
Across eight hedge fund categories, there is a statistically significant intercept term rang­
ing from approximately 55 basis points per month for Fixed Income Arbitrage to 96 basis 
points for Convertible Arbitrage. There appears to be an average alpha, adjusting for these 
risk factors.
Column M2 presents the combined explanatory power of a five-factor extension of FF 
factors: MKT, SMB, HML, MOM and CSV. For Equity Hedge, Equity NonHedge and
8
89 o f  128
Equity Neutral, all five factors are significant. For Merger arbitrage, Distressed Securities 
and Convertible Arbitrage, five factors except MOM are significant. A small portion of funds 
in Fixed Income and Global Macro has significant exposure to MKT and CSV. For eight 
categories except Distressed Securities and Fixed Income, the explanatory power of the five- 
factor extension is larger than those of FH seven-factor. Specifically, the adjusted R-squared 
for the FH /FF factors is 22.12%/29.22%, 44.72%/55.53%, 14.60%/24.34%, 21.13%/22.89%, 
9.23%/15.81% and 18.56%/19.29% for Equity Hedge, Equity NonHedge, Equity Neutral, 
Merger Arbitrage, Convertible Arbitrage and Global Macro respectively.
Another significant change is in the intercept term (alpha) of the regressions. Compared 
with the results of FH seven-factor, both the magnitude and significance level of the intercept 
term drop dramatically. The average intercepts for Equity Hedge, Equity NonHedge and 
Global Macro become negative, indicating little to no added value from the average fund 
manager. These results attest to the importance of five-factor in explaining the source of 
hedge fund returns.
Next, we include FF factors along with FH seven factors to assess their joint explanatory 
power (excluding MKT and SMB as they are included in seven factors). Column M3 shows 
that the magnitudes and significance levels of all remaining variables in the all-inclusive 
regressions are quantitatively similarly to the previous results. The combination of two sets 
of factors increase the explanatory power. Adjusted R2 ranges from 17.73% for Fixed Income 
Arbitrage to 54.79% for Equity NonHedge.
Finally, while the fund-by-fund results reported above strongly suggest that FH and FF 
factors capture the systematic exposure of hedge funds, we can use the entire data set to 
make more definitive statements about the statistical significance of each factor. We report 
the results of joint (across funds/time) tests of significance in Table 5. In particular, we 
estimate a fixed fund-specific model of the form
T it  =  OLi +  PiSt +  @2 Ft +  ^ i t  (2)
with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), where now the parameters /^and /32 are
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constrained to be the same across funds within the same category. Our PCSE specification 
allows £u to be contemporaneously correlated and heteroskedastic across funds, and autocor­
related within each fund’s time series. The magnitude and significance of individual factors 
is consistent with previous results but adjusted R2 decreases.
Overall, the evidence suggests that both the FH seven-factor model and five-factor ex­
tension of the FF model capture the systematic exposure of hedge fund returns1. In terms of 
the explanatory power, FF model outperforms FH model for 6 categories, which is consistent 
with the fact that the equity-style fund is a sizeable portion of the hedge fund industry.
3.3 Statistical factor analysis o f hedge fund returns
We further use asymptotic principal components approach, suggested by Connor and Kora- 
jczyk (1988), to estimate the pervasive factors influencing hedge fund returns. It is similar 
to standard principle components except that it relies on asymptotic results as the number 
of cross-sections grows large and it gives direct estimates of the time-series sample of factor 
returns, rather than the factor beta matrix. Using an unbalanced panel to extract asymp­
totic principal components, we first obtain 0 , cross product matrix of returns by defining it 
element-by-element, each time using only the set of securities which have returns in both of 
the pair of time dates
^  Tltr
fifr =  — y 'ritrjT, t, T  =  1 , T  (3)
where ntT is the number of assets with returns in both period t and r. Connor and 
Korajczyk (1988) find that the first k eigenvectors of Q, can be used as the estimates of the 
factor returns.
We implement asymptotic principal component (APC hereafter) analysis of (1) hedge
*It is well documented that hedge fund returns exhibit substantial serial correlation. Lo (2001) and 
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) have shown that such high serial correlation in hedge-fund returns is 
likely to be an indication of illiquidity exposure. To remove the impacts of artificial serial correlation on 
estim ates of risk exposure, we adopt the methodology in Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) to unsmooth 
hedge fund returns and repeat the above analysis. Overall, the estimated exposure to different factors is 
largely not affected by smoothing.
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fund returns and (2) the residuals of the time-series regressions. These residuals reflect 
variation unexplained by FH and FF models. Comparing the two illustrates how well FH 
and FF risk factors capture the systematic exposure of hedge fund returns.
We first estimate the factors by applying asymptotic principal components to the entire 
sample of hedge funds in each category over the sample period 1994 to 2004. To understand 
the behavior of the statistical factors in relation to hedge fund returns, we regress hedge fund 
returns on the first factor, the first five factors, and the first ten factors. We also use the 
method suggested by Bai and Ng (2002) to select the number of factors2. They set up the 
factor number determination problems as a model selection problem which involves a trade­
off between model parsimony and good fit to the data. The tests are variations on Akaike 
and BIC information criteria-based tests. We repeat the above analysis for the residual of 
the time-series regressions.
Table 6 summarizes the results of the APC analysis based on hedge fund returns, as well 
as on the unexplained variation reflected by the regression residuals. For each category, the 
first common factor captures between 11.55% to 39.78% of hedge fund return variation. The 
explanatory power of each subsequent principal component is significantly smaller. Not sur­
prisingly, the overall explanatory power of the first five factors is larger than those of FH and 
FF factors since the statistical factor model is estimated by maximizing explanatory power. 
Among eight categories, the explanatory power of statistical factors for Equity Neutral is 
the lowest.
Focusing on the residuals which are from the time-series regressions on the combination 
of FH and FF factors, the explanatory power of the first principle component declines dra­
matically, accounting for 1.12% to 13.84% of hedge fund return variation. However, the 
subsequent principal component does not decline as before. The overall explanatory power 
of the first five factors ranges from 13.89% to 36.34%. This suggests that there axe latent 
factors which axe not captured by FH and FF models.
In summary, our APC analysis provides evidence that FH and FF factors successfully
2 However, their method suggests a large number of factors. Since our goal is to detect if significant 
unexplained system atic variation remains in the residuals, rather than establishing the number of factors, 
we focus on the first five and ten factors.
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explain a large part of variation of hedge fund returns but some latent factors may still 
remain unidentified.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, using 609 hedge funds over the 1994-2004 period, we document that both FH 
seven-factor and a five-factor extension of FF explain a significant part of the systematic 
exposure of hedge funds. The explanatory power of aggregate FH and FF factors varies across 
categories, ranging from 17.73% to 54.79% of the total variation in hedge fund returns. We 
also demonstrate that the explanatory power of FF factors is larger than those of FH seven- 
factor for all categories except Distressed Securities and Fixed Income Arbitrage, indicating 
FF factors better capture some of the systematic risk of hedge funds than FH seven factors. 
This is due to the fact that a large portion of the hedge funds is equity-oriented and FF factors 
are all equity risk factors. Asymptotic principal component analysis of the individual fund 
regression residuals reveals that for all categories, FH and FF models successfully capture 
systematic variation in hedge fund returns. However, the overall explanatory power of the 
first five factors ranges from 13.89% to 36.34%, indicating there are latent factors which are 
not captured by the FH and FF models.
Understanding the sources of hedge fund returns is an important area of research. We 
need a better understanding of this issue while making investment decisions involving hedge 
funds. A number of factor models have been put forward to explain hedge fund returns. Our 
results provide useful information on the comparison of explanatory power of these different 
factor models to investors dealing with portfolio construction and risk management related 
issue.
Future research may be to develop passive investment approaches that capture latent 
factors. Moreover, since hedge funds’ strategies vary across funds and style categories, to 
improve the performance of factor models and goodness-of-fit, one could expand the scope 
of factors and combine different factors to each hedge fund category. More sophisticated 
nonlinear methods including nonlinear regression, regime-switching processes can be used to
12
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capture inherent nonlinearities of certain hedge fund strategies.
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Table 1 Summ ary Statistics of H edge Funds
This table presents cross-sectional means and standard deviations of basic summary statistics for funds in the CISDM 
database over the sample period January 1993 to August 2004. K  is the number of funds. SD denotes standard deviations.
Category K Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis h % P2%
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Mkt neutral 121 0.96 0.57 3.88 2.98 0.44 1.19 6.57 5.70 13.85 17.72 7.54 15.27
Eq hedge 58 0.99 0.84 5.18 2.74 0.01 1.10 6.40 4.85 13.99 16.23 6.88 14.16
Eq nonhedge 20 1.24 0.82 8.25 4.69 0.17 0.69 4.86 1.88 6.97 13.16 -0.01 11.30
Global macro 90 0.96 0.81 5.30 3.54 0.28 0.97 5.60 4.40 9.51 16.81 1.98 15.14
Distressed 72 1.08 0.59 3.82 3.01 -0.14 1.34 7.83 6.36 18.63 16.85 7.81 13.63
Merger arb 106 0.89 0.54 3.04 3.72 -0.17 1.14 6.70 5.20 20.67 15.82 11.63 15.57
Conv. arb 106 1.02 0.51 2.11 1.71 -0.14 1.38 7.18 5.33 30.93 17.31 12.81 16.87
Fixed income 36 0.58 0.35 2.37 1.97 -2.27 2.30 17.10 15.98 19.59 16.53 11.13 21.64
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Table 2
T h is ta b le  contains sum m ary sta tistic s  o f our risk factors: FH  seven-factor: S&;P 500 return m inus risk free ra te(S & P ), W ilshire  
sm all cap m inus large cap return (SC -L C ), change in th e  constant m aturity  y ield  o f th e 10-year Treasury (10Y ), change in th e  spread  
o f M o o d y ’s B aa  m inus th e  10-year Treasury (Cred Spr), bond P T F S  (B d  O p t), currency P T F S  (F X  O p t), and com m od ities P T F S  
(C om  O p t), w here P T F S  denotes prim itive trend follow ing strategy. F F  five-factor: th e  excess return o f th e  m arket portfolio  (M K T  
), a size factor w hich captures return difference betw een a portfolio of low -capitalization  stocks and a portfolio  o f h igh-cap ita lization  
stocks (SM B  ), and a value factor w hich captures return difference betw een a portfolio o f high book-to-price stock s and a portfolio  
of low  book-to-price stocks (H M L), cross-sectional vo la tility  (C SV ).
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Risk Factors
Statistics Mean Max Min St.Dev.
S&P 0.60 9.31 -14.89 4.44
SC-LC 0.04 16.41 -12.64 3.43
10Y -0.01 0.65 -0.53 0.24
Cred Spr 0.00 0.448 -0.25 0.13
Bd Opt 0.01 0.66 -0.24 0.16
FX Opt -0.01 0.90 -0.30 0.19
Com Opt -0.01 0.65 -0.23 0.13
MKT 0.56 8.18 -16.20 4.56
SMB 0.17 21.87 -16.58 4.23
HML 0.36 13.71 -12.66 3.87
MOM 0.81 18,40 -25.05 5.56
CSV 0.25 23.88 1.31 3.04
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Panel B: Correlations
S&P SC-LC 10Y Cred Spr Bd Opt FX Opt Com Opt MKT SMB HML
S&P 1.00
SC-LC -0.08 1.00
10Y 0.02 0.05 1.00
Cred Spr -0.10 -0.26 -0.64 1.00
Bd Opt -0.14 -0.05 -0.09 0.07 1.00
FX Opt -0.15 0.01 -0.19 0.14 0.17 1.00
Com Opt -0.13 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.13 0.29 1.00
MKT 0.97 0.12 0.03 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14 -0.12 1.00
SMB -0.03 0.92 0.09 -0.31 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.18 1.00
HML -0.43 -0.28 -0.09 0.10 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 -0.54 -0.51 1.00
MOM -0.29 0.15 -0.16 0.11 -0.05 0.13 0.18 -0.22 0.17 -0.07
CSV 0.17 0.34 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.13 0.25 0.45 -0.43
CSV
1.00
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Table 3: Explanatory Power of Individual Factors
This table reports the results from univariate regressions for each of the 609 hedge funds in our sample over 1994 to 
2004, regressing the hedge fund’s monthly returns on individual risk factors. Then we average the estimated coefficients 
across all funds and report the average values
Factor
Equity
hedge
Equity
non-hedge
Equity
neutral
Merger
arbitrage
Distressed
securities
Convertible
arbitrage
Fixed
income
Global
macro
P Rz P R2 P R2 P R2 P R2 P R2 P R2 P Rz
S&P 0.35 18.11 1.01 40.65 0.18 9.68 0.23 14.47 0.31 16.74 0.10 6.04 0.07 4.76 0.33 11.13
SC-LC 0.19 5.25 0.52 10.53 0.14 5.28 0.18 5.11 0.21 7.78 0.08 2.16 0.09 0.19 0.14 4.96
10Y 1.09 0.29 0.86 1.00 0.26 0.09 0.35 -0.10 0.56 1.03 0.24 0.56 1.35 2.84 -0.95 1.17
Cred Spr -4.65 2.33 -6.34 2.86 -1.18 1.39 -3.01 2.84 -4.73 6.55 -1.75 2.37 -4.95 7.00 -1.44 1.29
Bd Opt -2.43 1.26 -2.89 0.07 -0.48 0.02 -1.95 2.35 -3.86 4.23 -1.75 1.82 -2.71 3.50 -1.67 1.01
FX Opt -0.32 -0.47 -4.05 0.00 0.07 0.11 -0.71 -0.32 -0.81 -0.13 -0.38 -0.23 -1.36 1.38 1.34 1.71
Com Opt -1.82 0.19 -3.91 0.08 -0.87 0.09 -1.78 1.40 -0.68 0.85 -0.63 0.07 -0.97 -0.07 1.56 0.45
HML -0.23 10.75 -0.85 21.96 -0.13 6.83 -0.17 3.91 -0.19 5.67 -0.09 3.61 -0.03 1.37 -0.23 6.19
MOM 0.00 2.27 -0.10 5.32 -0.02 3.88 -0.04 0.55 -0.02 1.34 -0.01 0.63 0.01 -0.50 0.07 1.65
CSV 0.29 4.93 0.96 10.39 0.24 7.12 0.16 4.42 0.32 4.12 0.22 7.9 -0.08 2.75 0.36 3.22
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Table 4 Total Explained R eturn Variation
T h is tab le  sum m arizes th e results from three different specifications of regression: =  a* +  j3u S t  +  +  £u  , w here S t  is
th e vector o f FH  seven  factors realized at tim e t, F t is th e vector o f five-factor exten sion  o f F F  m odel at tim e t, and /3U and /32i 
are th e  vectors o f sen sitiv ities . C olum n M l presents th e  com bined exp lanatory power o f F H  seven  factors. C olum n M 2 presents th e  
com bined exp lan atory  power o f a five-factor exten sion  of F F  factors. C olum n M 3 reports th e  jo in t exp lan atory  power o f F F  factors 
and F H  seven  factors. W e report th e  m eans o f th e  factor sensitiv ities. T h e percentages of significant t-s ta tis tic s  are in p a r e n th e se s .
Equity Equity Equity Merger
Factor hedge non-hedge neutral arbitrage
M l M2 M3 M l M2 M3 M l M2 M3 M l M2 M3
C 0.79 -0 .15 -0 .1 7 0.61 -0 .6 9 -0 .7 7 0.85 0.03 0.03 0.75 0.55 0.57
(43%) (2%) (7%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (64%) (17%) (21%) (78%) (37%) (39%)
S&P 0.33 _ 0.38 0.98 _ 0.89 0.19 _ 0.21 0.22 0.23
(67%) (72%) (100%) (95%) (51%) (53%) (67%) (70%)
SC-LC 0.25 _ 0.19 0.63 _ 0.45 0.21 _ 0.15 0.22 _ 0.20
(43%) (40%) (80%) (60%) (36%) (38%) (60%) (47%)
10Y -0 .0 4 _ 0.49 -1 .45 _ -1 .69 0.44 _ 0.54 -0 .6 0 _ -0 .6 8
(5%) (3%) (5%) (25%) (17%) (19%) (n% ) (n% )
Cred Spr -2 .1 2 - -2 .46 -1 .0 9 - -3 .3 0 2.14 _ 1.48 -1 .7 6 - -2 .4 9
(17%) (19%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (19%) (22%) (25%)
Bd Opt -0 .7 8 - -0 .2 2 1.46 - 0.90 0.08 - 0.17 -0 .8 4 - -0 .8 0
(16%) (16%) (15%) (15%) (9%) (9%) (21%) (21%)
FX Opt 1.58 _ 1.64 0.09 _ 0.53 1.06 - 1.04 0.54 _ 0.56
(12%) (14%) (10%) (10%) (10%) (10%) (9%) (12%)
Com Opt -0 .11 _ -0 .0 8 0.97 _ 0.51 -0 .2 2 _ 0.48 -0 .4 2 - 0.05
(5%) (5%) (10%) (0%) (8%) (7%0 (16%) (13%)
MKT 0.40 0.94 0.20 0.25
(74%) (100%) (55%) (65%)
SMB - 0.12 _ 0.25 _ 0.07 - 0.16
(33%) (35%) (29%) (47%)
HML - 0.16 0.08 _ 0.01 -0 .16 _ 0.08 0.05 - 0.10 0.01
(40%) (34%) (45%) (60%) (33%) (40%) (54%) (38%)
MOM - 0.06 0.07 - 0.04 0.04 _ 0.03 0.03 _ -0 .01 -0 .0 2
(36%) (41%) (35%) (45%) (32%) (35%) (8%) (17%)
CSV _ 0.16 0.18 _ 0.32 0.36 . 0.18 0.18 _ 0.02 0.03
(31%) (31%) (32%) (40%) (42%) (40%) (29%) (39%)
Adj.it^ 22.12 29.22 30.53 44.72 55.53 54.79 14.60 24.34 25.62 21.13 22.89 24.51
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Factor
Distressed
securities
Convertible
arbitrage
M l M2 M3 M l M2 M3
c 0.90 0.58 0.55 0.96 0.27 0.24
(74%) (42%) (54%) (85%) (33%) (33%)
S&P 0.29 _ 0.29 0.09 _ 0.07
(65%) (64%) (39%) (29%)
SC-LC 0.25 _ 0.25 0.07 - 0 . 0 2
(60%) (61%) (20%) (17%)
10Y -1 .3 7 _ -1 .41 -0 .4 4 - -0 .40
(19%) (24%) (15%) (14%)
Cred Spr -5 .01 - -5 .1 3 -1 .8 4 - - 2 . 0 0
(43%) (43%) <22%) (26%)
Bd Opt -2 .7 4 - -2 .71 -1 .3 2 - -1 .3 9
(56%) (43%) (20%) (20%)
FX Opt 0.45 _ 0.48 0.17 - 0.26
(6%) (4%) (3%) (6%)
Com Opt 0.90 _ 1.43 0.07 _ 0.60
(8%) (6%) (9%) (8%)
MKT 0.35 0.09
(72%) (35%)
SMB - 0.24 _ 0.04
(69%) (18%)
HML _ 0.19 0.05 _ 0.05 0 . 0 2
(54%) (32%) (19%) (20%)
MOM - - 0 . 0 1 -0 .0 3 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0
(18%) (21%) (17%) (16%)
CSV - 0.03 0.09 - 0.14 0.17
(21%) (22%) (54%) (53%)
Adj .b !2 28.41 27.35 31.78 9.23 15.81 17.78
Fixed
income
M l M2 M3
0.55 0.77 0.53
(61%) (39%) (33%)
0.05 _ 0.07
(22%) (19%)
0.06 _ 0.05
(n%) (n%)
-0 .61 _ -0 .4 2
(14%) (17%)
-5 .2 5 - -4 .8 7
(39%) (42%)
-1 .5 9 _ -1 .4 9
(17%) (28%)
-0 .6 7 - -0 .6 9
(6%) (14%)
0.28 _ 0.39
(14%) (0%)
- 0 . 1 1
(22%)
- 0 . 1 1
(22%)
- 0.09 0 . 0 2
(17%) (8%)
- 0.06 0 . 0 0
(8%) (11%)
- -0 .1 6 -0 .0 3
(!9%) (18%)
Global
macro
M l M2 M3
0.57 -0 .0 3 -0 .0 4
(46%) (13%) (16%)
0.33 _ 0.34
(57%) (49%)
0.19 - 0.13
(42%) (26%)
-1 .7 5 - -1 .3 9
(23%) (13%)
-3 .7 5 - -3 .3 7
(17%) (14%)
-0 .6 7 _ -0 .4 9
(22%) (10%)
1.94 - 1.92
(18%) (n%)
1.63 _ 1.44
(13%) (13%)
- 0.36
(58%)
- 0.09
(24%)
_ 0 . 1 0 0 . 0 2
(29%) (23%)
_ 0.08 0.06
(29%) (21%)
_ 0 . 1 1 0.14
(26%) (20%)
14.58 8.59 17.73 18.56 19.29 22.83
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Table 5 FH  and FF Factors Across Styles Pooled regressions
This table reports the results of joint (across funds/time) tests of significance. We estimate a fixed fund-specific model: 
rit =  +  p-^St +  (32Ft +  £it , with panel corrected standard errors, where the parameters /^and j32 are constrained to be
the same across funds within the same category. Our PCSE specification allows to be contemporaneously correlated 
and heteroskedastic across funds, and autocorrelated within each fund’s time series.
Factor
E quity
hedge
E quity
non-hedge
E quity
neutral
Merger
arbitrage
D istressed
securities
C onvertible
arbitrage
F ixed
incom e
G lobal
m acro
P t P t P t P t P t P t P t P t
C -0.15 -0.60 -0 .68 -1 .74 0.07 0.50 0.52 3.54 0.61 3.14 0.98 3.03 0.37 2.59 0.03 0.15
S& P 0.37 10.91 0.92 17.94 0.19 9.63 0.23 11.01 0.24 8.97 0.08 4.56 0.03 1.45 0.29 10.02
SC-LC 0.21 5.12 0.44 7.26 0.18 7.17 0.21 8.31 0.21 6.37 0.05 2.20 0.01 . 0.59 0.15 4.29
10Y 0.37 0.53 -0 .94 -0.89 0.63 1.56 -0 .60 -1.46 -1.51 -2 .79 -0 .58 -1.41 -0 .23 -0 .54 -1 .75 -1 .86
Cred Spr -2 .35 -1.81 -3 .00 -1 .56 1.55 1.10 -1.23 -1 .62 -4 .64 -4 .65 -1 .66 -2.15 -3 .43 -4 .38 -3 .82 -3 .54
B d  O pt -0 .60 -0 .75 0.86 0.72 0.16 0.34 -1.03 -2.15 -3 .25 -5 .16 -1 .34 -2.81 -1 .88 -3 .73 -0 .87 -1 .23
F X  O pt 1.53 1.16 0.72 0.68 1.17 2.68 0.41 0.94 0.37 0.64 0.25 0.57 -0 .66 -1 .44 1.89 1.90
C om  O pt 0.19 0.19 0.80 0.51 0.40 0.64 -0.05 -0 .08 1.03 1.25 -0 .02 -0 .03 0.25 0.39 1.78 0.97
HML 0.11 2.55 -0 .20 -3 .27 0.05 2.16 0.01 0.51 0.03 1.10 0.03 1.43 0.03 1.22 0.03 0.84
M O M 0.08 3.46 0.07 2.03 0.02 1.72 0.00 0.25 -0.01 -0 .46 0.01 0.53 0.02 1.70 0.10 4.96
C SV 0.18 3.96 0.31 4.44 0.18 6.53 0.05 1.79 0.07 1.17 0.14 4.27 0.42 1.58 0.14 1.62
A d j .f l2 11.85 32.82 5.77 7.67 12.50 7.41 5.22 7.48
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Table 6. A sym ptotic Principal Com ponent Analysis
We report the explanatory power (adjusted R 2) of statistical factors. We implement asymptotic principal component 
analysis of (1 ) hedge fund returns and (2 ) the residuals of the time-series regressions.
Returns 
Factor numbers
Equity
hedge
Equity
non-hedge
Equity
neutral
Merger
arbitrage
Distressed
securities
Convertible
arbitrage
Fixed
income
Global
macro
1 23.20 39.78 13.80 11.55 25.34 20.24 22.16 15.93
5 45.55 69.28 28.97 32.31 43.68 40.91 45.84 29.60
1 0 57.30 81.58 37.82 46.92 57.22 51.46 69.29 39.73
Residuals
1 6.75 5.63 5.97 1 . 1 2 6.91 5.23 13.84 8.18
5 27.38 36.80 13.89 19.01 24.41 30.37 36.34 16.76
1 0 43.63 60.83 25.95 32.09 37.22 41.71 59.67 30.42
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Abstract
W e in troduce a general and flexible fram ework for hedge fund perform ance evalu­
ation  and asset allocation: stoch astic  dom inance (SD ) theory. Our approach u tilizes  
sta tistica l te sts  for stoch astic  dom inance to  com pare th e  returns of hedge funds. W e 
form hedge fund portfolios by using SD  criteria and exam ine th e  out-of-sam ple per­
form ance of th ese  hedge fund portfolios. C om pared to  perform ance of portfolios of 
random ly selected  hedge funds and m ean-variance efficient hedge funds, our results  
show  th a t fund selection  m eth od  based on SD  criteria greatly  im proves th e  perfor­
m ance of hedge fund portfolio.
K eywords: A lpha; M ean Variance analysis; Portfolio; R isk  R eturn
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the number of hedge funds has risen by about 20 percent per year 
to reach around 8,500 in 2006. The amount of assets under management of the hedge fund
•Departm ent of Finance, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United 
Kingdom. E-mail address: s.li4@lse.ac.uk.
^Department of Economics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United 
Kingdom. E-mail address: o.linton@lse.ac.uk.
industry has increased from around $40 billion in 1990 to an estimated $1,400 billion in 2006. 
Since hedge funds typically use leverage, the positions that they take in the financial markets 
are large enough to move markets around the world. The rapid growth in hedge funds reflects 
the increasing importance of this alternative investment category for institutional investors 
and wealthy individual investors.
Correspondingly, identifying hedge fund managers with superior skills and refining the 
traditional portfolio management tools to optimize investments in a large universe of hedge 
funds have also become challenging tasks in portfolio management. If the top hedge fund 
performance can be explained by superior skills owned by managers not by luck, we would 
expect top performance of such managers persists. However, there is little consensus on 
hedge fund performance persistence in the empirical finance literature. A number of studies 
find that hedge fund performance only persist at short term (one to three months) which 
might be due to hedge funds’ illiquid exposure and there is no evidence of performance 
persistence at annual horizons, (see Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004, Brown, Goetzmann 
and Ibbotson, 1999, Agarwal and Naik, 2000, Liang, 2000, Bares, Gibson and Gyger, 2003, 
Boyson and Cooper, 2004, Baquero, Ter Horst and Verbeek, 2005). On the contrary, more 
recent study by Kosowskia, Naik and Teo (2006) finds that sorting hedge funds on Bayesian 
alphas yields a 5.5 percent per year increase in the alpha of the spread between the top and 
bottom hedge fund deciles. Hedge fund performance persists at annual horizon. Using a 
novel GMM procedure to estimate alpha for hedge fund managers, Jagannathan, Malakhov 
and Novikov (2006) find evidence of hedge fund managers’ performance persistence over 
three year horizons.
More practical issue facing hedge fund investors is how to construct an efficient hedge 
fund portfolio or add hedge funds to the existing portfolio. The standard mean-variance 
approach to portfolio allocation, which is founded on the assumption of normal distributions 
and an objective function of maximizing risk-adjusted return, is inadequate when dealing 
with portfolios of hedge funds. A number of studies (see Lo, 2001, Amin and Kat, 2003) 
have shown that risk characteristics of hedge funds are substantially different from those of 
traditional investment pools because hedge fund managers usually employ highly dynamic
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trading strategy and use short selling, leverage, concentrated investments, and derivatives. 
Specifically, hedge fund returns are not normally distributed and exhibit significant skew­
ness and kurtosis. They also tend to display significant co-skewness with the returns on 
other hedge funds as well as equity. Mean-variance models ignore these higher moments of 
the return distribution, and thus fail to take into consideration the benefits of funds that 
occasionally surprise on the upside while they also underestimate the risk of funds that have 
asymmetric downside risk. Despite the weakness of mean-variance frame work, it still dom­
inates in practical hedge fund portfolio management. The Sharpe ratio is commonly used 
to quantify the risk-return trade-off. Amenc, Giraud, Martellini and Vaissie (2004) report 
that only 2% of the European multi-managers pay attention to skewness and kurtosis; while 
84% of multi-manager funds consider that volatility is of major concern to their clients and 
82% consider Sharpe ratio as an important indicator. A number of studies also address the 
issue of including hedge funds in standard institutional portfolios in mean-variance portfolio 
optimization, (see, Amenc and Martellini, 2002, Brunei, 2004, Kat, 2005, Till, 2005).
Another strand of literature develops different frameworks for hedge fund allocation, 
which incorporate a variety of investment objectives, particularly investor preferences for 
skewness and kurtosis of returns, into portfolio optimization models. Using a Polynomial 
Goal Programming (PGP) optimization model, Davies, Kat and Lu (2005) solve for multiple 
competing hedge fund allocation objectives within a mean-variance-skewness-kurtosis frame­
work and analyze different impacts of various hedge fund strategies on the distribution of 
optimal portfolio. Morton, Popova and Popova (2006) study hedge fund allocation issue by 
assuming a family of utility functions which are a weighted sum of the probability of achieving 
a benchmark and expected regret relative to another benchmark. They then use a Monte 
Carlo method to obtain a solution to the related portfolio optimization model. Alexander 
and Dimitriu (2004) develop a portfolio construction model by selecting funds according to 
their ranking of alpha estimated with factor models. They then allocate selected funds using 
constrained minimum variance optimization.
In this paper, we introduce a more general and flexible framework for hedge fund asset 
allocation   stochastic dominance (SD) theory. Our approach utilizes statistical tests
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for stochastic dominance to compare the returns of hedge funds. The theory of stochastic 
dominance (see, Hadar and Russell, 1969, Hanoch and Levy, 1969, Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1970, and Whitmore, 1970) provides a systematic framework for analyzing economic behavior 
under uncertainty. We form hedge fund portfolios by using SD criteria. We then examine 
the out-of-sample performance of these hedge fund portfolios. Compared to both randomly 
selected hedge fund portfolio and mean-variance efficient hedge fund portfolio, our results 
show that fund selection method based on SD criteria greatly improves the performance of 
hedge fund portfolio.
Our framework relying on stochastic dominance has several advantages. First, we are able 
to use the information embedded in the entire empirical return distributions of hedge funds 
instead of a finite set of sample statistics. Second, while mean-variance analysis is consistent 
with the expected utility theory only under relatively restrictive assumptions about investor 
preferences or the statistical distribution of the investment returns, SD criteria do not require 
a full parametric specification of investor preferences, but rather rely on general preference 
assumptions which are intuitively close to the real objectives of investors, for example, non­
satiation in the case of first order stochastic dominance (FSD) and risk aversion in the 
case of second order stochastic dominance (SSD). This is important because the view of 
investors towards various hedge funds depends crucially on their investment objectives and 
risk preferences.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2  introduces stochastic domi­
nance framework. Section 3 describes the data and reports the results of empirical analysis 
and a comparison of performance of various hedge fund portfolios constructed by using 
different criteria. Section 4 concludes.
2 Stochastic Dominance
Stochastic dominance theory provides a possible comparison relationship between two sto­
chastic distributions. Stochastic dominance relations offer a general decision rule for decision 
making when facing the choice between random payoffs, given that the utility functions share
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some common characteristics such as non-satiation or risk-aversion. In this paper, we test 
for the first and second orders of stochastic dominance.
Let X i and X 2 be two outcome variables. Let U\ denote the class of all von Neumann- 
Morgenstern type utility functions, u, such that u! >  0, (increasing). Also, let U2 denote the 
class of all utility functions in U\ for which u" <  0 (strict concavity). Let F\(x) and F2 (x) 
denote the cumulative distribution functions, respectively.
D efinition 1 X \ First Order Stochastic Dominates X 2, denoted X \ >:f s d  X 2, if and only
if:
(1) E [u(X i)] >  E [u(X 2)] for all u 6  U\, with strict inequality for some u; Or
(2 )  Fi(x) <  F 2(x ) for all x with strict inequality for some x.
D efinition 2 X \ Second Order Stochastic Dominates X 2, denoted X \ >z s s d  X 2, if  and only 
if  either:
(1) E [u(X i)] >  E[u (X 2)] for all u € U2, with strict inequality for some u; Or:
< j'—QQ F2 (t)dt for all x with strict inequality for some x.
For any two outcomes i, j  define
5ij =  sup Fi(x) -  F j(x),
x € X
where X  is contained in the supports of Xi, X j. Fund i dominates fund j  if Sij <  0. If a fund 
X \ second order dominates fund X 2 then no risk averse individual would prefer X 2 to X \. 
First order dominance of one outcome by another is even stronger: If a fund X \ first order 
dominates fund X 2 then no individual who prefers more wealth to less would prefer X 2 to 
X \. First order dominance implies second order dominance. Note that these concepts do not 
require the existence of moments of the underlying outcomes unlike mean variance analysis. 
Furthermore, both relations are transitive, i.e., if X \ dominates X 2 and X 2 dominates X 3 
then X i  dominates X 3 . However, neither relation denotes a full ordering, only a partial 
ordering. That is, we may not be able to rank two outcomes at all according to either 
relation. In such cases, one can either say one is indifferent between the two investments
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or one can impose more preference structure to discriminate between them. One possibility 
is to increase the dominance order to third order or fourth order etc., which reduces the 
set of noncomparability. Alternatively one can then supplement the partition induced by 
the dominance relation by some additional criterion like Sharpe ratio. In practice, although 
FSD implies strong relationship between two outcomes, it is not very discerning because the 
cumulative distributions of net returns of the two investment alternatives often intersect, in 
which case FSD cannot discriminate between the alternatives. For decision malting under 
risk more important is SSD. If investors are risk averse and prefer more to less, SSD could 
be used to choose between two outcomes.
In empirical analysis, stochastic dominance analysis requires the comparison of the proba­
bility distributions of two outcomes which are unknown and must be estimated from available 
data. Various statistical tests for the existence of SD orders have been developed. Several 
tests proposed earlier (for example Anderson, 1996 and Davidson and Duclos, 2000) compare 
the distribution functions only at a fixed number of arbitrarily chosen points. In general, 
comparisons using only a small number of arbitrarily chosen points will have low power if 
there is a violation of the inequality in the null hypothesis on some subinterval lying between 
the evaluation points used in the test. More recent tests proposed by Barrett and Donald 
(2003) and Linton, Maasoumi and Whang (2003) compare the two distributions at all points 
in the sample.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Description o f the data
In this section, we provide an empirical analysis of hedge fund database under Stochastic 
Dominance framework. The database used in this paper covers the period January 1994 to 
August 2004 and was provided by the Center for International Securities and Derivatives 
Markets (CISDM). It has two parts: a total of 1,269 live hedge funds and 1,760 dead hedge 
funds. To reduce survivorship bias, we include both live and dead funds in our analysis.
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Each set consists of a performance file, containing monthly net-of-fee returns, total net 
assets, and net asset values, and a fund information file, containing fund name, strategy 
type, management fees, and other supplementary details. We select only those funds with 
at least 2 years of monthly observations. To ensure there are enough funds in different fund 
categroies, we analyze 6  fund strategies, namely Merger Arbitrage, Distressed Securities, 
Equity Hedge, Market Neutral, Convertible Arbitrage and Global Macro. Table 1 lists 
summary statistics of the hedge funds from CISDM database during the January 1994 to 
August 2004 period. For each strategy, the table lists the number of funds and means and 
standard deviations of basic summary statistics.
3.2 R esults
To compare hedge fund returns using stochastic dominance concepts, our procedure includes 
two steps. First, we take into account the systematic risk exposure of hedge funds and obtain 
the risk-adjusted returns of hedge funds. Then we test for FSD and SSD relations among 
risk-adjusted hedge fund returns relying on Linton, Maasoumi and Whang (2003) statistical 
test.
Risk adjustments for hedge fund returns are difficult due to their use of derivatives and 
dynamic trading strategies. Commonly used methods include using hedge fund indices and 
factor models. More recently, a number of studies (see Kat and Palaro (2005)) argue that 
sophisticated dynamic trading strategies involving liquid futures contracts can replicate many 
of the statistical properties of hedge-fund returns. Hasanhodzic and Lo (2006) estimate linear 
factor models for individual hedge funds using six common factors, and find that for certain 
hedge-fund style categories, a significant fraction of funds’ expected return can be captured 
by common factors.
Here we use as performance benchmarks the seven-factor model developed by Fung and 
Hsieh (2004). The Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate 
(SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant 
maturity yield of the 10-year Treasury (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody’s Baa mi­
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nus the 10-year Treasury (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), 
and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS denotes primitive trend following strat­
egy. Fung and Hsieh (2004) show that their factor model strongly explains variation in 
individual hedge fund returns.
In order to obtain risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds, we regress the net-of-fee 
monthly excess return (in excess of the risk free rate) of a hedge fund on the seven-factor 
model.
Ri,t =  oci +  p j  Zt +  (1 )
where Pi represents the risk exposure of fund i at month t to the various factors, and Zt 
is the monthly value of different factors. The risk-adjusted return of fund i at month t is 
calculated as:
a t
ai,t =  Ri,t — Pi Zt =  oti +  e t^, (2 )
A
where Riit is the net-of-fee monthly excess return of fund i in month t, (3^  is the estimated 
risk exposure for fund i, and Zt is the value of the various factors at month t. We compute 
the risk-adjusted returns aitt as the sum of the intercept a* and the residual e t^ of E q.(l). 
We plot the distribution of the intercept a  in Figure 1 .
We next conduct an analysis of the distributions of risk-adjusted returns of the funds, 
with a view to establishing stochastic dominance orderings. For each fund i we compute the 
empirical c.d.f. and integrated c.d.f. [denoted s.d.f.] as follows
Ti
Fi(x) =  £ £  ! ( * « < * )
1 t= 1
T
Si{x) =  f  Fi{x')dx' =  ^  ^2{x  -  Xit) l (Xit < x),
J-oo J-i t= 1
where X it =  aiyt is risk-adjusted return. We say that a fund i is first order dominated if for
8
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some fund j
max. Fj(x^) — Fi(xe) <  0,
where x i , . . . ,  Xl is a grid of points contained in the union of the supports of the distributions. 
Likewise, for second order dominance.
Let T d  =  { i : i is first order dominated} and let T y  be the complement of this set in the 
full set of funds, likewise define S o  and Sy.  Clearly, F D C  Sy  and so Sy C Ty.
We compute the set of all funds that are undominated across all pairwise comparisons. 
We then construct a portfolio of all undominated funds. To examine the out-of-sample 
performance of undominated funds, we construct portfolios of funds Sy  on January 1 each 
year (from 1999 to 2004), based on stochastic dominance orders of risk-adjusted hedge fund 
returns estimated over the prior five years. The portfolios are equally weighted monthly, 
so the weights are readjusted whenever a fund disappears1. We also construct the portfolio 
of first-order dominated funds for comparison purpose. Given the economic intuition of 
stochastic dominance that any risk averse individual should choose funds in Sy  and any 
investor who prefer more to less should not choose funds in T y ,  we expect portfolio of funds 
in Sy exhibit much better performance than portfolio of funds in Ty.
To compare stochastic dominance tests with mean variance tests, we also apply mean and 
variance efficient criteria to risk-adjusted returns of hedge funds. We construct portfolios of 
mean-variance efficient funds on January 1 each year (from 1999 to 2004), based on means 
and variances of risk-adjusted returns of funds estimated over the prior five years. A fund 
is defined as a mean-variance efficient fund if no other funds have both higher means and 
lower variances than this fund. Hence, funds are selected by comparing only two summary 
statistics: the mean and the variance, which represents the distribution of risk-adjusted 
hedge fund returns.
A number of studies find that hedge fund portfolio return properties vary substantially 
with the number of hedge funds included in the portfolio. See, Amin and Kat (2002), Davies,
1 Under a pessimistic scenario, the money invested into disappeared hedge funds cannot be recovered. 
Hence we assume -100% return to a fund during the month after it disappears from the database, and zero 
returns thereafter.
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Kat and Lu (2003), Alexander and Dimitriu (2004). A hedge fund portfolio including only 
ten funds will typically have significantly higher variance than a similar hedge fund portfolio 
containing 100 funds. Therefore, to assess the robustness of SD analysis, we also construct 
representative portfolios containing the same number of funds as in Su for each year (from 
1999 to 2004). The funds in portfolios are-randomly selected.
Table 2 reports the number of hedge funds held by portfolios for each year and Table 
3 reports summary statistics and alphas of portfolios constructed using different criteria. 
Alpha is estimated using the seven-factor model. As we can see in table 2 , the number of 
funds in Su is around 30 which is close to those of mean-variance efficient funds while the 
number of funds in T o  is substantially larger, ranging from 849 to 1225. French, Ko and 
Abuaf (2005) examine the current fund of hedge funds universe, and find that funds of hedge 
funds report holding between 1 and 200 underlying funds, and generally hold 10-30, with 
close to 20 on average. Hence, the number of holdings in Su and mean-variance efficient sets 
is actually close to practitioner standards. Amin and Kat (2003) also find that the optimal 
size of well diversified hedge fund portfolios is in the range of 15 to 20.
According to Table 3, the mean return of portfolio of funds in Su is 0.99 which is substan­
tially larger than those of other portfolios. The first two moments of returns provide a great 
deal of the information about the investment outcome set of portfolios, but not everything. 
We find the skewness for portfolio of funds in Su is 2.36 which is much larger than for other 
portfolios. Positive skewness means essentially that the big outcomes are on the upside so 
there is relatively little chance of large negatives. From a variety of points of view positive 
skewness is desirable.
Moreover, the portfolio of funds in Su generates an alpha of 9.91 percent per year. As the 
t-statistics in column ten shows this alpha is statistically significant. The alphas of portfolios 
of funds in and mean-variance efficient funds are also statistically significant but much 
lower than the alpha of portfolio of funds in Su- The alpha of the randomly picked funds 
portfolio is the lowest and statistically insignificant.
Figure 2,3,4 plot the time series of returns of these representative portfolios. We also plot
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the cumulative returns2 of representative portfolios and Standard Poor’s 500 index in Figure 
5. As we can see from the figure, the portfolio constructed by using SD criterion achieves a 
much higher cumulative return than those of other portfolios.
To further investigate the nature of the stochastic dominance approach, we establish 
stochastic orders within each style category. We then repeat the above performance analysis. 
Table 4 reports the results for each category. We find that overall the portfolio of funds in 
Su display superior performance in all categories. In particular, the portfolio of funds in Su 
in the Merger arbitrage category achieve relative higher alpha than that of mean variance 
efficient funds. For equity neutral funds, the performance of stochastic dominance approach 
is not better than that of mean-variance approach.
It is also well documented that hedge fund returns exhibit substantial serial correlation, 
see Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and Okunev and White (2003). They suggest that 
hedge funds’ exposure to illiquid assets is the primary source of the strong observed serial 
correlation in hedge fund returns. To remove the effects of artificial serial correlation, we 
employ the methodology in Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) to unsmooth hedge fund 
returns and repeat the above analysis on the unsmoothed hedge fund returns. Overall, the 
performance of stochastic dominance approach still dominates other approaches.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we introduce a general and flexible framework for hedge fund performance 
evaluation and asset allocation. Our approach utilizes recent advances in statistical tests for 
stochastic dominance. The approach is able to recognize and use the information embedded 
in the non-normal return distributions of hedge funds. To illustrate the method’s ability 
to work with non-normal distributions, we form hedge fund portfolios by using SD criteria 
and examine the out-of-sample performance of these hedge fund portfolios. Compared to 
performance of portfolios of randomly selected hedge funds and mean-variance efficient hedge
n
2 The cumulative return is the compound return of the series: C u m R n =  (17 U +  r0 )  ~  L where r i , .., rn
1 = 1
is a monthly return series.
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funds, our results show that fund selection method based on SD criteria greatly improves 
the performance of hedge fund portfolio. The mean return of portfolio of funds in Su is 
substantially larger than those of other portfolios. We also find that the skewness for portfolio 
of funds in Su is 2.36 which is much larger than for other portfolios. Positive skewness is 
desirable because it means essentially that the big outcomes are on the upside so there 
is relatively little chance of large negatives. Mean-variance optimization models do not 
necessary achieve this result. Different specifications of investor preferences will result in 
considerable differences in the impact of skewness on optimal hedge fund allocations.3
There are a number of potential areas for improvement. First, the equal weighting of 
undominated funds can be replaced by more targeted weighting based on some univariate 
performance criterion like Sharpe ratio. Second, we could look at higher order dominance or 
asymmetric dominance notions like Prospect or Markowitz dominance. Third, we could take 
account of sampling variation in constructing the set of undominated funds by including those 
funds that are within some distance (controlled according to a statistical criterion like Type 
1 error using the results of Linton, Maasoumi, and Whang (2003)) from being dominated. 
This would enlarge the set of undominated funds and it may not improve performance out 
of sample. Finally, although our SD test shows ability in distinguishing good funds from bad 
funds, it is restricted to pairwise comparison of a finite number of choice alternatives, and it 
has limitations with full diversification possibilities. The problem is that the ordering of the 
outcomes of a diversified portfolio of funds cannot be determined in a straightforward way 
from the orderings of the individual funds. Therefore, the ordering of each portfolio has to be 
determined individually. A number of recent studies recently developed Linear Programniing 
(LP) tests for SD that do fully account for diversification.4 Post and Versijp (2006) develop 
tests for SSD and TSD efficiency that axe embedded in the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) framework. This test has superior statistical properties to the above LP tests and is 
a serious rival to the dominant meanrvariance tests. We leave the application of these tests 
to hedge funds as future research.
3 See Brockett and Kahane (1992), Cremers, Kritzman, and Page (2005)
4 See Post (2003), Kuosmanen (2004), Post and Levy (2005) and Post and van Vliet (2006)
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Table 1
Summ ary statistics o f hedge fund returns
This table presents means and standard deviations of basic summary statistics for funds 
in the CIDSM database over the sample period January 1994 to August 2004. SD denotes 
standard deviations. p x%  and p 2%  denote first order and second order autocorrelation re­
spectively.
C ategory M ean SD Skew ness K urtosis h % p 2%
M ean SD M ean SD M ean SD M ean S D M ean SD M ean SD
M arket neutral 0.96 0.57 3.88 2.98 0.44 1.19 6.57 5.70 13.85 17.72 7.54 15.27
E q u ity  hedge 0.99 0.84 5.18 2.74 0.01 1.10 6.40 4.85 13.99 16.23 6.88 14.16
D istressed  securities 1.08 0.59 3.82 3.01 -0 .14 1.34 7.83 6.36 18.63 16.85 7.81 13.63
M erger arbitrage 0.89 0.54 3.04 3.72 -0 .17 1.14 6.70 5.20 20.67 15.82 11.63 15.57
C onvertib le arbitrage 1.02 0.51 2.11 1.71 -0 .14 1.38 7.18 5.33 30.93 17.31 12.81 16.87
G lobal M acro 0.96 0.81 5.30 3.54 0.28 0.97 5.60 4.40 9.51 16.81 1.98 15.14
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Table 2
Num ber o f funds
This table reports the numbers of funds held in portfolios of second order undominated 
funds (Su), mean-variance efficient funds, first order dominated funds (FD) over the sample 
period: January 1999 to August 2004. The portfolios are constructed on January 1 each 
year. N is the number of funds.
Year T ota l N  of funds N  of funds in F jd N  of funds in  S u N  of M V  efficient funds
1999 1054 849 13 27
2000 1269 947 20 30
2001 1405 1074 22 25
2002 1532 1046 37 24
2003 1582 1084 30 31
2004 1639 1225 19 28
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Table 3
Summ ary statistics o f returns for representative portfolios
This table reports summary statistics of returns for portfolios of second order undomi­
nated funds (Su),  mean-variance efficient funds, first order dominated funds (FD), randomly 
selected funds over the sample period: January 1999 to August 2004. The portfolios axe 
constructed on January 1 each year.
M ean M edian M ax M in S td .D ev . Skew K urtosis A lp h a
(p ct/y ea r)
t-sta t  
of alph
funds in  S u 0.99 0.83 13.09 -3.25 2.42 2.36 11.98 9.91 3.25
M V  efficient funds 0.69 0.75 7.82 -2 .78 1.61 1.41 8.25 7.01 3.81
funds in  F q 0.48 0.50 6.07 -3 .98 2.04 0.04 2.91 4.42 3.66
funds random ly picked 0.32 0.01 8.08 -4 .96 2.30 0.55 4.13 2.19 1.12
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Table 4
Summ ary statistics o f returns for representative portfolios w ithin  styles
For each style category, this table reports reports summary statistics of returns for port­
folios of second order undominated funds {Su), mean-variance efficient funds, randomly 
selected funds over the sample period: January 1999 to August 2004. The portfolios are 
constructed on January 1 each year.
M ean M edian M ax M in S td .D ev . Skew K urtosis A lpha
(p ct/y ea r)
t-sta t  
o f alph
E quity  hedge  
funds in S u  
M V  efficient funds 
funds random ly picked
1.28
1.41
0.9
0.35
0.53
0.62
27.78
18.82
12.01
-4.49
-3 .24
-5 .05
4.43
3.88
4.99
3.57
1.82
1.03
20.59
9.57
8.91
0.89
1.07
0.86
1.96
2.54
1.85
E quity  neutral 
funds in S u 0.94 0.75 11.91 -2 .49 1.84 3.11 19.81 0.81 4.36
M V  efficient funds 0.95 0.86 8.86 -2 .89 1.54 2.13 13.04 0.85 5.13
funds random ly picked 0.71 0.49 5.54 -3 .58 1.75 0.19 3.62 0.64 3.82
M erger arbitrage  
funds in S u 0.81 0.8 6.77 -3 .05 1.59 0.74 5.75 0.71 4.38
M V  efficient funds 0.61 0.46 4.08 -1 .75 0.94 0.95 7.81 0.62 4.78
funds random ly picked 0.53 0.52 10.54 -6 .45 2.71 0.54 5.41 0.29 1.22
D istressed  securities  
funds in S u 1.05 0.96 4.05 -2 .68 1.39 -0 .15 3.37 1.02 6.78
M V  efficient funds 1.02 0.99 4.18 -3 .45 1.62 0.02 3.56 0.99 5.69
funds random ly picked 0.92 0.65 4.97 -2.82 2.13 1.48 8.51 0.82 4.29
C onvertib le arbitrage  
funds in S u 1.07 0.97 4.83 -0 .89 0.89 1.45 7.34 1.03 8.3
M V  efficient funds 0.95 0.78 2.95 -0.63 0.76 0.57 4.23 0.93 8.54
funds random ly picked 0.92 0.9 3.76 -1 .34 0.97 0.31 3.69 0.89 5.62
G lobal m acro  
funds in  S u 1.01 0.91 4.71 -2 .53 1.59 1.51 6.58 0.92 7.12
M V  efficient funds 0.96 0.90 2.92 -1 .98 1.42 0.53 5.56 0.90 8.12
funds random ly picked 0.78 0.63 3.51 -2 .78 2.11 0.62 5.78 0.67 1.85
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F ig u re  1: T h is  figure p lo ts  cro ss -sec tio n  e s t im a te s  o f  a lp h a  o f  h ed g e  fu n d s in  our sa m p le .
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Figure 2: This figure plots return time series of portfolios of second undominated funds (SUD) 
and of first order dominated funds (FSD) . The portfolios are constructed on January 1 each year
from 1999 to 2004.
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Figure 3 and 4: These two figures plot returns of portfolios of second undominated funds (SUD), 
mean-variance efficient funds (MV) and randomly selected funds. The portfolios are constructed
on January 1 each year from 1999 to 2004.
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Figure 5: This figure plots cumulative returns of portfolios of second undominated funds (SUD), 
mean-variance efficient funds (MV), first order dominated funds (FSD). The portfolios are 
constructed on January 1 each year from 1999 to 2004. For comparison purpose, we also plot 
cumulative returns of Standard & Poor 500’s stock index (01/1999 to 08/2004)
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